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NOTES
Reverse Confusion: Modifying the
Polaroid Factors to Achieve Consistent
Results
Molly S. Cusson*
INTRODUCTION
In a typical trademark infringement case, the trademark owner
seeks to prohibit a subsequent user, generally a smaller company,
from using the same or similar mark.' A secondary purpose in
such "direct confusion" cases is to prevent the infringing party
from causing consumers to mistake the defendant's products as
emanating from the trademark owner' S.2 In "reverse confusion"
cases, however, the trademark owner is often a smaller and lesser
known company, and the infringing second user is generally larger
and more well known; therefore, consumers may associate the mark
with the larger company and be confused into believing that the
smaller company is actually the infringing party.3
For instance, most consumers are probably familiar with the
tune to "Gatorade is Thirst Aid for that deep down body thirst."
But, suppose instead that there was an advertisement for "Pet's
THIRST-AID." Would the jingle: "for that deep down body thirst"
still come to mind? And, if so, would most assume that Pet's
THIRST-AID was thus somehow associated with Gatorade? In
other words, would the assumption automatically be that Pet "bor-
rowed" the term "THIRST-AID" from Gatorade?
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1996. I would like to thank
my family and friends for their constant support and encouragement.
1. See generally 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 23.01[5], at 23-22 (3d ed. 1995).
2. See generally id.
3. See generally id.
180 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
In fact, the mark "THIRST-AID" was registered 34 years be-
fore Gatorade even started using it.4 Even though most consumers
associate "THIRST-AID" with "that deep down body thirst," it was
actually Joseph Middleby, Jr. Inc. ("Middleby, Inc.") that first reg-
istered the mark "THIRST-AID" in 1950 in connection with its soft
drinks and beverage syrups,5 and later assigned the mark to Pet
Inc., ("Pet") for use in connection with Pet's isotonic beverage.6
It was not until 1984, more than thirty years after Middleby, Inc.
initially registered the mark, that Gatorade first started using its
own "Thirst Aid" mark.7
Nonetheless, upon hearing the words "Thirst Aid," most con-
sumers automatically think of Gatorade and hum "for that deep
down body thirst." Despite the fact that Pet's first use of the mark
"THIRST-AID" pre-dated Gatorade's first use, if Pet now used the
"THIRST-AID" mark, most consumers would mistakenly believe
that Pet's products somehow emanated from Quaker Oats' Gatorade
product, or that Pet was the second user attempting to infringe
upon Gatorade's good will.'
Reverse confusion is" similar to direct confusion in that it ex-
amines whether a trademark has been infringed; however, it is also
a legal phenomenon distinct from direct confusion in that the mar-
ket positions and motivations of the parties are reversed. 9 Nonethe-
less, courts have failed to acknowledge that reverse confusion in-
fringement is a separate legal paradigm from traditional confusion.
Consequently, courts have continued to apply the direct confusion
test to reverse confusion cases as well. There is a problem in treat-
4. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949-50, (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1879 (1993).
5. Id. at 949.
6. An isotonic beverage is one which is specifically formulated to replenish the fluids
and minerals lost by the body through perspiration, especially the loss caused by strenu-
ous exercise. Id. at 950 n. 1.
7. See id.
8. For an explanation of "good will" in trademarks, see MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 2.08.
9. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.01[5], at 23-22 ("In a reverse confusion situa-
tion, rather than trying to profit from the senior user's mark, the junior user saturates the
market and 'overwhelms the senior user."').
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ing both types of confusion synonymously, however, in that the
likelihood of confusion test, originally developed to analyze direct
confusion situations,10 does not provide an adequate treatment when
applied to reverse confusion, yet the courts continue to use the
'same test for both situations.
This Note analyzes the problems and inconsistencies encoun-
tered when applying the direct confusion test to a reverse confusion
claim and argues the need for a more focused, uniform approach.
Part I defines reverse confusion and explains how it differs from
direct confusion in trademark infringement. Part I also describes
the history of the reverse confusion doctrine, including its initial
recognition by the Tenth Circuit in 1977. Part II introduces and
outlines the likelihood of confusion test as initially developed in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.," a direct confusion
case. Part III examines how courts have subsequently applied the
likelihood of confusion test to reverse confusion cases by studying
in depth several reverse confusion cases. The purpose of this side-
by-side examination is two-fold. It demonstrates, first, that the fac-
tors for direct confusion cannot be equitably applied to reverse
confusion, and, second, that the these factors are applied inconsis-
tently among the federal circuits. Part IV argues that such devia-
tions have caused inconsistencies among the courts and that a more
comprehensive means for analysis is needed. Finally, this Note
concludes .that the courts should take more progressive steps in
defining reverse confusion and adjusting the Polaroid factors to
conform more specifically to the reverse confusion scenario, and it
outlines a means for doing so.
I. REVERSE CONFUSION-WHAT IT IS AND How IT DIFFERS
FROM DIRECT CONFUSION IN A TYPICAL TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CASE
A. Background
In a typical direct confusion case, the senior user generally has
a mark which has gained national recognition through extensive
10. See infra part II.C (discussing the origins of the likelihood of confusion test).
11. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
1995]
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advertising; thus, it is well-developed in the public eye.'2  When
the senior user has such a recognizable mark and the junior user
adopts a similar mark, confusion occurs because "customers mis-
takenly think that the junior user's goods or services are from the
same source as or are connected with the senior user's goods or
services."1 3  In these cases, the junior user is generally attempting
to profit from the good will attached to the senior user's mark.'4
Conversely, in a reverse confusion situation, consumers are
confused as to the source of the senior user's goods; the public
comes to believe that the senior user is actually the second user
and that the senior user's goods somehow emanate from those of
the junior user.'5  Reverse confusion generally occurs when the
junior user-the infringer-is more financially equipped than the
senior user 6 and is able to gain national recognition by saturating
the market with advertising and promotion.' 7 The outcome, thus,
is that "reverse confusion occurs when the junior user's advertising
and promotion so swamps the senior user's reputation in the market
that customers are likely to be confused into thinking that the se-
nior user's goods are those of the junior user: the reverse of tradi-
tional confusion."' 18  In addition, reverse confusion differs from
12. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d
Cir. 1986) (enjoining Lois Sportswear from using back pocket stitching pattern similar to
the one for which Levi held registered trademark and which was intimately associated
with Levi's products). For the purpose of this Note, the "senior user" is defined as the
first user of a mark, while the "junior user" is the second user of a similar mark.
13. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.01[5], at 23-22.
14. Id. § 23.01[5], at 23-22 to 23-23.
15. See 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 21.09, at 21-52 to 21-53 (4th ed. 1981). The Gatorade case is a
perfect example of this--consumers are confused as to the source of the senior user's
(Pet's) product. The public comes to believe that the senior user's product (Pet's) some-
how emanates from the junior user (Gatorade).
16. Id. § 21.09, at 21-53.
17. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.01[5], at 23-22.
18. Id.; see, e.g., Tanel Corp. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 774 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1990).
Where plaintiff, owner of the registered trademark "360°" for shoes, sued defendant,
Reebok, for using "3600 Jam" on its athletic shoes, the court held that:
Reebok's use of plaintiffs mark may result in confusion as to the origin of
Tanel's product. Reebok is a much larger and longer established enterprise than
Tanel, and the Reebok trademark and trade name is one of the best if not the
[Vol. 6:179
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direct confusion in that the junior user in reverse confusion is not
trying to gain anything from its association with the senior user's
mark:
A reverse confusion claim differs from the stereotypical
confusion of source or sponsorship claim. Rather than
seeking to profit from the goodwill captured in the senior
user's trademark, the junior user saturates the market with
a similar trademark and overwhelms the senior user. The
public comes to assume the senior user's products are really
the junior user's or that the former has become somehow
connected to the latter.'9
Such is the case in the "THIRST-AID" example, where consumers
so closely associate the mark with Gatorade that most would as-
sume that Pet's product somehow emanated from Gatorade's prod-
uct.
20
One might question, however, why a senior user with a weak
mark, like Pet, would object to an association with such a well-
established mark or company, like Gatorade. In fact, some courts
view the situation as beneficial to the less-financially equipped
senior user, and have perceived the senior user as receiving a "free
ride" through its association with the more powerful, well-estab-
lished junior user.21 However, the "free ride" attitude-that the se-
nior user could only stand to benefit from such an association with
a more nationally recognized junior user-assumes that the junior
user is one with which the senior user would unequivocally choose
best known names to potential purchasers of footwear. Purchasers who saw
"360 ° ' ' on a Reebok shoe before ever seeing a Tanel shoe might conclude that
Tanel was in some way affiliated with Reebok, that plaintiffs shoes were made
by Reebok, or that Tanel in using "360 ° " was imitating Reebok.
Id. at 56.
19. Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th
Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
20. The public might also assume that it was Pet who was infringing on Gatorade's
mark. Such an association could serve to negatively impact the good will of Pet's name.
See infra text accompanying note 255 (emphasizing the importance of. protecting the
trademark owner's good will in reverse confusion cases).
21. See, e.g., W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567,575 (2d Cir.
1993); see also infra text accompanying note 226.
19951
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to be associated. In fact, there are sound reasons why a smaller
senior user would not want such an association, even with a larger,
more marketable company or trademark.22 For example, the senior
user may want to expand into new areas with a mark; however,
expansion might be impeded if a newer, more powerful company
adopted a similar mark. 3 Additionally, the junior user's company
might stand for certain ideals with which the senior user does not
want to be associated.24
Most of the federal circuit courts have accepted the doctrine of
reverse confusion,25 based on the belief that "[w]ithout the recogni-
22. See, e.g., Ameritech, 811 F.2d at 964 ('The result [of such an association] is that
the senior user loses the value of the trademark-its product identity, corporate identity,
control over its goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new markets.").
23. See, e.g., Quaker; 978 F.2d at 956, 959 n.13. This was actually the case in
Quaker where Pet had developed an isotonic beverage and had test marketed it in 20
stores in South Carolina, using the same media and the same channels of trade as
Gatorade. Id. at 950. The beverage met with a fair amount of success, capturing approxi-
mately 25% of the isotonic beverage market in the test area. Id. However, once the
assignee attempted to license the mark nationwide, it was impeded from moving into new
markets by Gatorade's use of a similar mark. Id. at 959 n. 13; see also infra text accom-
panying note 242.
24. Consider the case where former body builders form a small, local rock band
named Pump for the purpose of "promot[ing] physical self-improvement as an alternative
to drugs, thereby providing a positive role model for today's youth." Pump, Inc. v.
Collins Management, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (D. Mass. 1990). The name Pump
is then adopted by a nationally-recognized rock band, Aerosmith, for use on its album.
Id. at 1164. How then is the small band, Pump ever to expand on its name and continue
to project an image of physical fitness when most music enthusiasts would associate them
with the rock band Aerosmith? Even though the court ultimately ruled in favor of the
defendant, it did acknowledge that the reverse confusion in this case could serve to
destroy the goodwill of the band, Pump: "Given its strong anti-drug stance, this confusion
could be especially damaging to the band Pump. The court notes that like many rock
bands, Aerosmith has been rumored to be associated with a hedonistic lifestyle and a
rather laissez-faire attitude toward substance abuse." Id. at 1166 n. 11.
25. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466 (3d Cir. 1994);
In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993); DeCosta v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 981
F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1992); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co., v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947
(7th Cir. 1992); Americana Trading Inc., v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir.
1992); Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir.
1987); Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983); Capital
Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980); Big 0 Tire
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977); see also
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.01[5], at 23-25 to 23-26.
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tion of reverse confusion, smaller senior users would have little
protection against larger, more powerful companies who want to
use identical or confusingly similar trademarks. 26 However, in
spite of the courts' recognition of the concept of reverse confusion,
the doctrine itself, as applied, does not always guarantee protection
for the smaller,, lesser known senior user. Consider, for example,
some of the companies who have prevailed in using trademarks
similar to those of a smaller, senior user-Ford Motor Company,
27
American Telephone & Telegraph ("AT&T"), 8 Gillette,29 and
Reader's Digest. 30
The reason that reverse confusion protection is often illusory is
that although most of the circuits have recognized the doctrine, the
means for analyzing reverse confusion differs from circuit to cir-
cuit, thereby producing inconsistent results.31 There are two prob-
lems contributing to this inconsistency. The first problem is that
the test that courts apply for analyzing reverse confusion is the
same test that is used for determining direct confusion. Even
though reverse confusion is its own legal phenomena, courts have
failed to fully recognize this and have failed to tailor a test specifi-
cally for reverse confusion.32 The second problem is that, even in
direct confusion cases, the determination of infringement is a high-
ly subjective test. This is because the test is based upon a number
of factors, none of which is dispositive, and all of which are highly
manipulable.33
26. Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 475.
27. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co:, 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968); see discussion infra part I.B.1.
28. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel: & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994); see discussion infra part III.C.3.
29. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1993); see
discussion infra part III.C.I.
30. Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991) (where
plaintiff used "New Choices Press" in publishing books and tapes on charisma, and
defendant, a subsidiary of Reader's Digest, thereafter used "New Choices for the Best
Years" for its magazine on retirement, the court found no infringement).
31. See discussion infra part III (analyzing the application of reverse confusion tests
through case law).
32. See infra text accompanying note 297.
33. See infra note 95 (noting the subjectivity of the Polaroid test).
1995]
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B. Origins of the Doctrine of Reverse Confusion
The concept of reverse confusion was first alluded to as early
as 1918, but was not judicially accepted until 1977.34 In 1968, the
Seventh Circuit, the first federal Court of Appeals to address the
concept, rejected it. Then, ten years later, the Tenth Circuit be-
came the first federal circuit court to accept it..
1. Westward Coach Manufacturing Co, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co.: Reverse Confusion Initially Rejected By The
Seventh Circuit
Westward Coach Manufacturing Co, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.35
was one of the first cases to directly address the concept of a re-
34. Although the doctrine of reverse confusion was not formally accepted by the
courts until 1977, see discussion infra part I.B.2, the concept of a reverse confusion type
of infringement claim as actionable by a court of law was first alluded to by Justice
Holmes in 1918. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In
that case, Justice Holmes asserted:
The ordinary case, I say, is palming off the defendant's product as the plain-
tiff's, but the same evil may follow from the opposite falsehood-from saying,
whether in words or by implication, that the plaintiff's product is the defen-
dant's .... The falsehood is a little more subtle, the injury a little more indi-
rect, than in ordinary cases of unfair trade, but I think that the principle that
condemns the one condemns the other.
Id. at 247 (Opinion per Holmes, J.).
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the concept of reverse confusion in 1980. Capital
Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980). It first noted a
1944 AMERICAN LAW REPORT which it called "a subtle precursor of the Doctrine of
Reverse Confusion," id. at 394 (citing 148 ALR 56 (1944)), and then went on to acknowl-
edge a reverse confusion aspect of unfair competition:
The doctrine [of unfair competition] is applicable not only whereby the acts of
the infringer customers are mislead [sic] to believe that the infringer's goods,
services or business are the complaining party's, but also where the impression
is created that the complaining party has sponsored, or approved or is in any
way connected with the activities of the infringer, or that the latter is affiliated
with, or a part or a branch and subsidiary of the former.
Id. at 394 (quoting Burge v. Dallas Retail Merchants Ass'n, 257 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953) (emphasis omitted) (first alteration in original)).
However, it was not until 60 years after Justice Holmes first acknowledged the exis-
tence of such a situation, and 33 years after it was memorialized in the AMERICAN LAW
REPORTS that a court formally accepted the theory. After the Seventh Circuit rejected the
notion of reverse confusion in 1968, see infra part I.B.I; the Tenth Circuit finally ac-
knowledged and accepted it in 1977, ruling for the plaintiff. See infra part I.B.2.
35. 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
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verse confusion doctrine. 36 Westward, a smaller, less-financially
equipped company than Ford, argued that Ford's use of the mark
"MUSTANG" created a likelihood of confusion as to the source of
the first user's product.37
In 1960 Westward Manufacturing began using the "MUS-
TANG" mark on its campers, and in 1962 Westward secured an
Indiana state trademark registration for the "MUSTANG" mark
along with the representation of a charging horse. 38 The applica-
tion indicated that the "MUSTANG" mark would be used on "utili-
ty coaches, vehicle-carried accommodations for campers or travel-
ers, vans, and the like. 39
Also in 1962, Ford Motor Company built an experimental
sports car and began using the name "MUSTANG. 40 Westward
informed Ford that it had been using the name and mark since
1960 and requested that Ford cease its use of the word "MUS-
TANG., 41 Ford responded that it did not believe Westward had an
exclusive right, and that, furthermore, there was no likelihood of
confusion between Ford's product and Westward's product.42
In Westward, the Seventh Circuit's analysis focused on the
minimal expansion of the mark on the part of the plaintiff, the
defendant's countervailing capability of effectively exploiting the
mark (i.e., its financial position), and the relative market positions
of the two companies. 43 Moreover, the court used a direct confu-
36. Id. at 633-34.
37. Id. at 631 ("[Westward] allege[s] that Westward's products and Ford's products
are closely related and that Ford's use of the MUSTANG name and representation of a
horse infringes Westward's trademark by creating a likelihood of confusion concerning
the source of the products and by preventing Westward's expansion into the manufacture
of self propelled recreational vehicles.").
38. Id. at 630.
39. Id. (citing Westward's registration application).
40. id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Ironically, Ford later conceded that the public was, in fact, likely to be
confused: "Appellants produced slight evidence of actual confusion, and Ford apparently
concedes the likelihood that Westward's MUSTANG-marked products will be mistaken
for products of Ford." id. at 633.
43. See id. at 635 ("It seems to follow as a necessary conclusion that the trade-mark
has the advantage of strength where its owner has invested a considerable amount in
1995]
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sion approach, analyzing whether the junior user was attempting to
pass off his goods as those of the senior user." Finding for the
defendant, Ford, the court concluded that the plaintiff Westward's
mark was weak and that there was no likelihood of confusion of
the origin of Ford's "MUSTANG" mark.45
In rejecting the plaintiff's reverse confusion claim, the Seventh
Circuit stated that: "[a]ppellants apparently put forth a suggested
doctrine of 'reverse confusion' concerning which we find no ratio-
nal basis for support.",46 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was seemingly
not yet ready to adopt the notion of reverse confusion.47
2 Breaking Ground: Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. and the Courts' First
Acknowledgement of Reverse Confusion
It was not until nearly ten years later, in Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,48 that the Tenth Circuit be-
came the first circuit court to recognize reverse confusion, inter-
preting Colorado's state trademark common law as implicitly in-
cluding a reverse confusion type of protection.49 By doing so, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado would wish to extend its
common law policy of both "protecting trade names and preventing
public confusion."5
advertising or can point to a long period of time during which his mark was used on a
great quantity of articles, as symbolic of his business ....... (quoting 3 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 82.1 at 1503-04 (2d ed.))). id.
at 634.
44. See generally id. at 633-34. But see discussion infra part IV.B.2.b (intent to pass
off is irrelevant in reverse confusion).
45. Westward, 388 F.2d at 635. But see supra note 15 and accompanying text (by
definition reverse confusion occurs when the consumer is likely to confuse the origin of
the senior user's product).
46. Westward, 388 F.2d at 634 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals
and Limits, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 7 (1994) ("The Seventh Circuit's opinion in West-
ward Coach sheds little light, except as a study in the psychology of judges who know
what conclusion they want to reach and are groping for a way. to get there over obstacles
set up by established legal principles.").
48. 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
49. Id. at 1371-72.
50. id. at 1372 (citing Wood v. Wood's Homes, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 285, 519 P.2d
[Vol, 6:179
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In Big 0 Tire the plaintiff Big 0 was a tire-buying and resell-
ing organization which provided tires and other services to approxi-
mately 200 independent retail tire dealers in 14 different states,
each of whom ideitified themselves as Big 0 tire dealers.51 Big 0
had two lines of private brand tires identified with the name "Big
Foot," which it began selling in 1974.52 Big 0 did not succeed,
however, in registering the "Big Foot" mark with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.53
Simultaneously, in 1974, Goodyear obtained a federal registra-
tion for its "Bigfoot" mark, to be used in conjunction solely with
its snowmobile tracks. 4 Goodyear subsequently decided to expand
its use of the mark "Bigfoot" and to use it in promoting its new
tires in a nationwide advertising campaign.5 5 Goodyear learned of
Big O's prior use of the "Big Foot" mark in conjunction with tires,
and before using the mark on its tire advertising campaign, Good-
year executives asked Big 0 for a letter indicating that it had no
objection. 6 Big 0, however, did object to Goodyear's use of the
mark "Bigfoot," and rejected Goodyear's offer of money in ex-
change for the use of the mark.
57
Despite Big O's objections, Goodyear nonetheless launched its
"Bigfoot" tires advertising campaign during a national telecast of
ABC's "Monday Night Football," 8 spending more than $9.5 mil-
lion in its first year's advertising campaign-a figure nearly 50
times that of Big O's entire net worth at the time. 59 Rather than
heeding the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision that a reverse confu-
1212, 1215-16 (1974)).
51. id. at 1367.
52. Id. at 1367-68.
53. Id. at 1368.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. In 1977, at the time of the trial, Big O's net worth was $200,000, while in
1974 Goodyear's net sales totalled $5.25 billion, and its net income was $157 million.
Id. at 1367.
1995]
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sion claim was not actionable,' the Tenth Circuit held for the
plaintiff Big 0, concluding that Goodyear infringed Big O's mark.61
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged Big O's reverse confusion
argument, holding that a junior user could be liable for infringe-
ment, even absent a showing of proof by the senior user that the
junior user intended to trade on its good will:
[t]he logical consequence of accepting Goodyear's position
[of no liability] would be the immunization from unfair
competition liability of a company with a well established
trade name and with the economic power to advertise ex-
tensively for a product name taken from a competitor. If
the law is to limit recovery to passing off, anyone with ade-
quate size and resources can adopt any trademark and de-
velop a new meaning for that trademark as identification of
the second user's products.62
The Tenth Circuit in Big 0 thus established a legal premise
under which a smaller senior user could recover for infringement.
The court did so, however, without establishing a test for analyzing
such a claim. 6
3
II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS-AS ORIGINALLY
DEVELOPED IN DIRECT CONFUSION
Following the Big 0 decision, there existed a legal premise for
a reverse confusion claim, yet no method of determining infringe-
ment in reverse confusion cases. 64 It was not until six years after
60. Westward, 388 F.2d at 634; see supra part I.B.1.
61. Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1372.
62. Id. (quoting the district court in 408 F. Supp. at 1236) (emphasis added).
63. While the Tenth Circuit was progressive in recognizing reverse confusion as a
valid claim, it never applied the doctrine to the case at hand. The court acknowledged
that a reverse confusion claim was actionable and set forth likelihood of confusion as the
relevant test. Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1371. However, it never delineated a means of applying
a likelihood of confusion test with respect to a reverse confusion claim.
64. One of the earliest courts to follow the Tenth Circuit's lead in recognizing
reverse confusion was the Fifth Circuit in Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods.,
Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980), which endorsed the Big 0 decision and the doctrine
of reverse confusion: 'The Big 0 decision [has] been lauded as a leading authority in the
[Vol. 6:179
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Big 0 that the Second Circuit, in Plus Products v. Plus Discount
Foods, Inc.,65 even acknowledged the need for a test to analyze
reverse confusion cases.66 Recognizing such a need, the Plus court
determined that a reverse confusion infringement analysis should
proceed along the same lines as a direct confusion analysis.67  In
a direct confusion analysis the plaintiff must first show that there
is a protectable mark.68 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
there is a likelihood of confusion-a likelihood that consumers
would be confused as to the sources of the two goods. 69 Because
both direct confusion and reverse confusion proceed along the same
lines, it is useful to examine the overall process for determining
trademark infringement.
A. Protectability of the Trademark: Determining
Distinctiveness
In analyzing whether a mark has been infringed, the plaintiff
must first prove that there is a protectable mark.7° Marks may be
characterized in descending order of protectability as: (1) arbitrary
or fanciful, (2) suggestive, (3) descriptive, or (4) generic. 7' Arbi-
trary, fanciful or suggestive marks are afforded the highest level of
protection,72 whereas generic names are not considered "marks" and
area of unfair competition and ... [r]everse confusion has now become a recognized
doctrine within the scope of unfair competition ...." Id. at 393.
Despite the Fifth Circuit's recognition and endorsement of the doctrine, however,
Charles Fries also failed to establish a test for analyzing such claims. In fact, in remand-
ing the case to the district court and instructing the court to apply the doctrine of reverse
confusion, the Fifth Circuit gave little guidance as to how to apply the doctrine, except
to cite to Big 0, which itself never articulated a test. Id. at 393-95. See discussion supra
part I.B.2 (discussing Big 0 case).
65. 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983).
66. See id. at 1004; see also discussion infra part III.A.
67. For an explanation of the two steps involved in examining infringement, see
Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1988).
68. See id.; see also discussion infra part II.A (discussing protectability of marks).
69. See Banff, 841 F.2d at 489; see also infra part II.B (discussing likelihood of
confusion).
70. See Banff, 841 F.2d at 489.
71. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976);
see also infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (further describing the four levels .of
protectability).
72. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 11.01[1] at 11-5 to 11-6.
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are therefore unprotectable. 7 If the mark is suggestive or arbitrary,
the mark is said to be inherently distinctive and the plaintiff does
not have to prove secondary meaning in order to present a claim.
74
If the mark is merely a descriptive one, however, the plaintiff must
73. Id. § 11.01[l] at 11-4.
INHERENTLY NON-INHERENTLY NO
DISTINCTIVE DISTINCTIVE DISTINCTIVENESS
No Secondary Secondary No Trademark
Meaning Required Meaning Reqd. Significance
Arbitrary or Descriptive,
Fanciful, or Geographic, or Generic
Suggestive Personal Name
Id. § 11.01 at Figure 1l.01A.
74. Id. "Secondary meaning" is an automatic association in the consumer's mind
between a mark and the product it represents. See Sunmark Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranber-
ries, Inc., 1994 LEXIS 15186 (N.D. 111. Oct. 13, 1994), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir.
1995) ("A descriptive term can become a protectible trademark if it has become distinc-
tive. The 'acquisition of distinctiveness is referred to as "secondary meaning."' Second-
ary meaning is a mental association in consumers' minds between the asserted trademark
and a single source of the product.") Id. at *21 (citations omitted).
The court in Sunmark examined several factors in determining whether the use of
two descriptive words combined into one--SweeTart-was still merely descriptive. See
id. at *19-22. It then went on to list different ways in which proof of secondary meaning
could be established, including through "direct consumer testimony, consumer surveys,
length and manner of use, amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, place in
the market and proof of intentional copying." Id. at *22 (quoting Spring Systems Co. v.
Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 1992)). However, the court also noted that
whether a descriptive trademark used on a product has acquired secondary meaning is a
question of fact. Id. at *23 n.12.
Additionally, other courts have held that there is a presumption of secondary mean-
ing for marks which have been federally registered. In Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992), the court held that:
"[Riegistered trademarks are presumed to be distinctive and should be afforded
the utmost protection ." ... [The defendant] therefore had the burden to prove
that secondary meaning had not attached if it wished to argue that [the plain-
tiff's] mark was weak. To the extent that secondary meaning had attached to
a descriptive mark, the mark was rendered stronger and more worthy of protec-
tion.
Id. (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION § 15:11, at 687 (2d ed. 1984)).
[Vol. 6:179
REVERSE CONFUSION
show that it has acquired secondary meaning.75 Characterization of
a mark may be based upon, among other things, the mark's origi-
nality or distinctiveness and its prevalence as a trademark used by
other entities."
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Once it has been established that the mark is protectable, the
plaintiff has the secondary burden of proving that there is a likeli-
hood of confusion that "an appreciable number of ordinarily pru-
dent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused,
as to the source of goods in question."77 Likelihood of confusion
exists when consumers viewing the mark would assume that the
product or service that the mark represents is associated with the
source of a different product or service identified by a similar
mark.78 Likelihood of confusion has thus been dubbed the "sine
qua non'79 of a trademark infringement claim in all circuits.80 In
any type of action for infringement, whether state or federal, proof
of the likelihood of confusion is essential.8 '
75. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.01[1], at 11-4 to 11-5.
76. Id.
77. See Banff, 841 F.2d at 489 (citations omitted). Although the process is broken
down into two steps, some courts treat the first step of determining protectability as part
of the likelihood of confusion process and merge it with the Strength of Mark factor. See,
e.g., infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
78. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.01[1].
79. "Sine qua non" is generally defined as: "Without which not. That without which
the thing cannot be. An indispensable requisite or condition." See BLACK'S LAW DicTIo-
NARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990)
80. Marcia Paul & Anthony F. LoCicero, Litigating Trademark, Section 43(a) and
Unfair Competition Cases, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION CASES 1993, 217, 263 (PLI in Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 374, 1993). The authors state that the basic test for all
trademark infringement claims, whether brought under common law, state trademark law,
or Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127, is likelihood of confusion.
Id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.0111]. Because the test is the same in all
cases, this Note will not differentiate between marks registered at the state level and those
registered federally.
81. An action for trademark infringement may be brought under a number of theories
including federal law, state law and common law. See, e.g., Long & Marks, supra note
47, at 1 ('"The essential element of a successful trademark infringement action is the exis-
tence of a likelihood of confusion. That remains the touchstone both for common law
and statutory infringement, as well as for a claim of unfair competition."); see also Paul
& LoCicero, supra note 80, at 263:
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The likelihood of confusion test is approached by weighing a
number of factors, which were originally delineated in the 1938
Restatement of Torts.82 Although each circuit has developed its
own likelihood of confusion test, 83 the Second Circuit set forth a
list of factors in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,84
which has been highly influential in the development of trademark
law.85 In addition, it was the Polaroid test that was first applied in
reverse confusion in Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc.86
Because the Polaroid test was used in Plus and is still used today,
it will provide the basis for discussion for the remainder of this
Note.87
C. The Polaroid Factors
In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,8 8 Polaroid
brought an action against the defendant alleging state and federal
trademark infringement and unfair competition for the defendant's
use of the name Polarad.8 9 By 1958, Polaroid was a $65 million
Once a trademark owner has demonstrated that he owns a valid and protectible
mark, the next-and most crucial--element in an action for trademark infringe-
ment is proof of likelihood of confusion. Whether an action for trademark
infringement is brought under common law, state trademark statutes, Section
43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, or the statutes pertaining to registered
trademarks, a successful plaintiff must always prove that the defendant's activi-
ties are likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception.
Id.
82. See Restatement of Torts, § 729 at 592-93 (1938); see also infra note 91 and
accompanying text (listing the Restatement factors).
83. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.06[4][a], at 24-49 to 24-57
(listing the factors used by the various circuits).
84. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); see also discus-
sion infra part II.C (discussing the Polaroid case).
85. See infra note 93. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.06[4][a], at 24-
52.
86. 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983); see also discussion infra part III.B (analyzing the
Second Circuit's application of the factors in Plus Products).
87. See infra part III.B (listing and applying the Polaroid factors). Although this
author acknowledges that each circuit has developed its own derivation of the eight-factor
Polaroid test, for purposes of simplicity this Note will use the term "Polaroid test" in
referring to the test developed by the Second Circuit, or any derivation thereof as used
by other circuits.
88. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
89. Id. at 493.
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company and owned the trademark Polaroid, 22 related U.S. regis-
trations and one New York state registration.9°
In responding to Polaroid's infringement claim, which was
based upon direct confusion, the Second Circuit derived the fol-
lowing list of factors from the Restatement of Torts:
[w]here the products are different, the prior owner's chance
of success is a function of many variables: the strength of
his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks,
the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the recip-
rocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark,
the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of
the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust
the possibilities-the court may have to take still other vari-
ables into account.91
Ironically, the Polaroid court never needed to explore this list of
factors in depth, because although the court acknowledged there
was some likelihood of confusion between at least two of the prod-
ucts, it held that the plaintiffs delay in proceeding against the
defendant barred the claim.92 Thus, while the Polaroid court set
out the list of factors which serves as the foundation for determin-
ing the likelihood of confusion,93 it was the task of subsequent
courts to set the parameters for analyzing and applying the factors.
90. Id. at 493-94.
91. Id. at 495 (quoting American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, §§ 729-31
(1938)).
92. Id. at 493. The plaintiff had waited 11 years to bring suit. See id. at 493-94.
93. See Paul & LoCicero, supra note 80, at 264:
The test for likelihood of confusion involves a balancing of several factors in
light of the particular facts of each case, with no single factor being determina-
tive. The majority of courts have formulated a test for determining likelihood
of confusion, based upon the balancing of several factors adopted substantially
from the Second Circuit's opinion in Polaroid Corp., and in Section 729 of the
Restatement of Torts.
id. (citation omitted).
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III. A FRAGMENTED MEANS OF ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE
POLAROID FACTORS IN REVERSE CONFUSION
As a result of the fragmented beginnings of the likelihood of
confusion analysis, a number of issues arise when applying the
Polaroid test to reverse confusion. First, the factors were set out
in Polaroid as a list and were never defined, even in the direct
confusion context. Thus the means for applying them have subse-
quently been developed and defined throughout case law in each of
the circuits, thereby producing inconsistent results.94 Some of the
inconsistencies stem from the origin of this test in the Second Cir-
cuit, and others from the way in which the test has been individual-
ly revised by each of the circuits.95
94. See discussion infra part IV.A (addressing the inconsistencies among the circuits
in applying the likelihood of confusion factors).
95. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.09, discussing "Judicial Schizophrenia in
the Second Circuit." In this section, discussing the period leading up to the 1961 Polar-
oid case and the determination of the list of factors, McCarthy points out the inconsisten-
cies within the Second Circuit decisions and the fact that there were two opposing fac-
tions co-existing, each citing to its own precedent. See id. One faction was attempting
to narrow the scope of protection in non-competitive goods cases, while the other one was
taking a more expansive approach. Id. § 24.90[2], at 24-73. The culmination of these
opposing factions was the eight-factor Polaroid test; however, as has already been noted,
no one factor within that test was dispositive. Id. § 24.09[4][b], at 24-80; see also infra
note 110. In addition, the Second Circuit has stated that "the Polaroid test is not a 'rigid
formula'. . . where the party with the greatest number of factors weighing in its favor
wins. Rather, it is a non-exhaustive catalogue of factors to be considered in determining
likelihood of confusion." Id. (quoting Physicians Formula Cosmetics, Inc. v. West Cabot
Cosmetics, Inc., 857 F.2d 80, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Consequently, it could be argued that the test was formulated merely as a way for
each of the opposing factions to continue taking its own approach, whether narrow or
expansive, by applying a subjective, yet uniform, eight-factor test, and "weighing," or
manipulating each of the factors to conform the overall result to its desired outcome. By
creating, in the first instance, such a subjective test for its own likelihood of confusion
determination, the Second Circuit set a precedent from which other circuits would derive
their own subjective list of factors.
This theory, taken to its limits, suggests that because the means for analyzing direct
confusion claims is flawed, the derivative reverse confusion test is likewise flawed. As
such, this theory could provide the basis for another entire discussion. For the purpose
of this Note, however, it should suffice to mention that some of the difficulties in apply-
ing the likelihood of confusion test to reverse confusion evolve from the highly subjective
nature of the test itself and from the means through which it is applied, not only through-
out the circuits, but within individual circuits as well.
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Second, and more importantly, the factors were originally de-
rived in a direct confusion case. Many courts have been remiss in
recognizing this fact and have consequently tried to apply the fac-
tors identically for direct confusion and reverse confusion situations
alike, overlooking that the two are distinct from one another and,
as such, should not be identically analyzed. 96 As will be demon-
strated in the discussion below, these difficulties have lead to a
doctrine of reverse confusion that is inconsistent and fragmented
throughout the circuits, as well as within some of the circuits.
The first circuit court to apply a Polaroid direct confusion test
in a reverse confusion situation was the Second Circuit in Plus
Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc.9 7 However, even though it
was the Second Circuit which originally developed the Polaroid
test, the court nonetheless had difficulty reviewing the district
court's balancing of the factors and in applying the factors for the
first time in a reverse confusion context.98
A. Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc.
In Plus Products, the plaintiff, Plus Products, Inc. ("Plus Prod-
ucts") began producing and selling health products in 1939 bearing
the mark "PLUS." 99 From that time on, Plus Products added vari-
ous products to its line, including pet foods, spices, and cooking
oils, all of which were known for high quality and high price.'0
By the end of 1981, Plus Products sold its goods in over 35 chains
with 923 retail locations. 01 Plus Products was also the owner of
three variations of the trademark "PLUS," and was diligent in at-
tempting to restrict use of the word "PLUS" in other trademarks. 10 2
The defendant, Plus Discount Foods ("Plus Discount"), opened
96. See, e.g., infra note 283 and accompanying text. But see infra text accompany-
ing note 297.
97. 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. See generally infra notes 132, 158, 179, 187 and accompanying text.
99. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1002.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Between 1970 and 1983 (the time of the suit), Plus Products had sent cease
and desist letters to companies relating to more than 130 various uses of the mark
"PLUS." Id.
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its first discount store in 1979 selling, among other things, pet
foods, spices, and food oils under its own "PLUS" label.10 3  In
contrast to Plus Products' practice of selling high quality goods,
Plus Discount established its stores as a bargain-type operation."°4
Plus Discount, despite prior knowledge of Plus Products' use
of the mark "PLUS" for similar types of products, incorporated and
adopted "PLUS" as the trade name for both its stores and its brand
name items. °5 Within two years of incorporation, in 1981, Plus
Discount had 81 stores in operation."° Plus Products subsequently
brought an action against Plus Discount seeking to enjoin Plus
Discount from using the mark, and the district court granted an
injunction with respect to three overlapping goods.'0 7 The defen-
dant appealed the judgment which enjoined it from using the mark,
and the plaintiff cross-appealed seeking both a recovery of damages
and a broadening of the scope of the injunction. 08
Once the district court determined that the case was a question
of reverse confusion, it had to decide what type of analysis to ap-
ply. It held that the Polaroid likelihood of confusion factors used
in determining direct confusion provided the basis for the appropri-
ate test.'0 9 The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the district
103. Id. at 1003 & n.4.
104. Id. at 1003. Plus Discount customers had to choose their purchases from bins
or cartons, had to.pay in cash, and had to bag their own goods. Id.
'105. Id. The parent company of Plus Discount Foods, the Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Company, Inc. ("A & P") was purchased by a German retailer, the Tenglemann
Group, who previously had used the "PLUS" mark in conjunction with a German chain
of discount food stores operating under the name "PLUS." Id. When purchasing the
American company, the defendant company conducted a trademark search of the mark
"PLUS" in the United States; the search revealed Plus Products' registrations. Id. In
addition, it attempted to register the mark, but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
refused registration. id.
106. Id. at 1003 n.4.
'107. Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 984, 995 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In addition, the district court required the defendant to add "Foods" to its logo and
to post disclaimers in its store as well as on its advertising. Id.
108. See Plus, 722 F.2d at 1001.
109. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 989 ("Although no precise precedent has been presented,
the most helpful tools for analysis of the likelihood of confusion are the commonly
accepted factors enumerated in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.") (citation
omitted).
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court's decision to use the Polaroid factors.110 The Second Circuit
acknowledged Plus Products' argument that, as a high quality man-
ufacturer, it did not want to be associated with a junior user pro-
ducing goods of inferior quality under a similar mark:
The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is chiefly directed to
reverse confusion as to the source of its products. It is
plaintiff's claim that consumers will perceive that Products'
line of health products is associated with or emanates from
[Plus Discount] Foods. If they conclude that defendant
Foods is the source of Products' goods, Products' reputation
for high quality merchandise may well become tarnished
because of Foods' bargain basement, no-frills image."1
Together, the district court for the Southern District of New York,
in the first instance, and the Second Circuit, affirming on appeal,
established that the Polaroid likelihood of confusion factors provid-
ed the appropriate test for analyzing reverse confusion cases. 2
B. The Polaroid Likelihood of Confusion Factors-As First
Applied to Reverse Confusion in Plus Products
Once the Second Circuit determined that Polaroid should be
applied to reverse confusion, the problems did not subside, howev-
er, because the question of how to apply the factors still re-
mained. 113 The district court first set out certain guidelines which
the Second Circuit, in reviewing the district court's balancing of
factors, attempted to define further.1 1 4 Subsequently, this same pro-
110. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1004. After confirming that the Polaroid test was the appro-
priate means for analysis, the court went on to note that, in applying the Polaroid test:
No single Polaroid factor is determinative. Rather each must be considered in
the context of all of the other factors, and from a balance of these determina-
tions, one is able to reach the ultimate conclusion, whether there is likelihood
of confusion between the two parties' products.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1003-04 (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 1004; Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 989.
113. See supra note 109 (Plus was essentially a case of first impression).
114. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1005 ("The district court comprehensively set out and scruti-
nized each of the Polaroid factors, and we find that none of the factual findings it made
is clearly erroneous. However, we do find that the court's balancing of the Polaroid
factors was incorrect.") Id.
Although other courts had acknowledged the reverse confusion doctrine after the Big
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cess of defining the likelihood of confusion factors with respect to
reverse confusion has been attempted by other circuits. Each-court
has emerged from the analysis, however, with a slightly different
version of the test, thus producing inconsistencies.
In order to understand the likelihood of confusion factors in the
context of reverse confusion, it is essential to first define the fac-
tors as they have evolved in direct confusion. This part will thus
break down the eight factors, defining them first, and then analyz-
ing how they were applied by both the district court and the Sec-
ond Circuit in Plus.
The eight likelihood of confusion factors, as set forth in Polar-
oid, are:
1) Strength of the Senior User's Mark
2) Actual Confusion
3) Quality of the Product
4) Sophistication of Buyers
5) Good Faith
6) Similarity of the Marks
7) Proximity of the Products
8) Bridging the Gap" 5
1. Strength of the Mark
"Strength of the Mark" is determined by the mark's relative
strength or weakness; 16 the weaker the mark, the less worthy it is
O decision and prior to the Plus decision, those cases never sought to establish a system
for analyzing such cases. See, e.g., Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided as a reverse confusion case in 1980, prior to the Plus
decision). The Charles Fries' court engaged in a lengthy discussion as to the merits of
the doctrine of reverse confusion and remanded. the case to the district court for applica-
tion of the doctrine. Id. at 392-95. However, it failed to give any instruction as to the
proper analysis of a reverse confusion claim. Id.
115. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
116. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)
(describing the strength of a mark as "its tendency to identify the goods sold under the
mark as emanating from a particular . . . source"). The Strength of the Mark factor
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of protection. 1 7  The four types of marks, in ascending order of
protectability, are: (1) generic, a common description of goods,
ineligible for trademark protection; (2) descriptive, describing a
product's features, qualities or ingredients, protectable only if sec-
ondary meaning is established; (3) suggestive, employing terms
which do not describe but merely suggest the features of the prod-
uct, requiring the purchaser to exercise "mature thought or follow
a multi-stage reasoning process;" ' 18 and (4) fanciful or arbitrary,
eligible for protection without proof of establishing secondary
meaning. 119
The Second Circuit, however, has treated "strength" (which is
generally the first factor in determining likelihood of confusion), as
synonymous with "distinctiveness" (which is the first step in deter-
mining if there has been infringement):
The term "strength" as applied to trademarks refers to the
distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency
to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating
from a particular, although possibly anonymous, source
historically has weighed the strength of the senior user's mark. See, e.g., Lois Sports-
wear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1986) (analyzing the
strength of the senior user's mark). However, more recently it has been suggested that
an analysis of the junior user's mark would be more appropriate in the context of a
reverse confusion situation. See, e.g., Quaker, 978 F.2d at 959-60 (the more appropriate
analysis in a reverse confusion scenario is to consider the strength of the junior user's
mark); Sunenblick v. Harrell and MCA, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 616, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(same); infra notes '332-35 and accompanying text.
.117. See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.01[1]. "'Fanciful' marks consist
of 'coined' words that have been invented or selected for the sole purpose of functioning
as a trademark." Id. § 11.03[1], at 11-10 (e.g., CLOROX bleach or KODAK photo-
graphic supplies). Id. § 11.03[4]. "Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols,
pictures, etc., that are in common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or
services in issue, neither suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of
those goods or services." Id. § 11.04[1] (e.g., BLACK & WHITE scotch whiskey, SUN
bank). id. § 11.04[3]. "Suggestive" marks merely suggest "some quality or ingredient
of goods." Id. § 11.20[1] (e.g., COPPERTONE sun tan oil, Q-TIPS wooden sticks with
cotton on end). Id. § 11.23, at 11-120 to 11-122. Marks are "descriptive" if they de-
scribe the "intended purpose, function or use of the goods; the size of the goods, the class
of users of the goods, a desirable characteristic of the goods, or the end effect upon the
user." Id. § 11.05[2][a] (e.g., BEER NUTS salted nuts, JOY detergent). Id. § 11.08, at
11-32 to 11-35.
118. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.21[1], at 11-108.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
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. . The strength or distinctiveness of a mark determines both
the ease with which it may be established as a valid trade-
mark and the degree of protection it will be accorded. 20
Thus, this factor borrows in some respects from the first step in the
infringement analysis, determining distinctiveness, or
protectability 12 1 However, initial distinctiveness of a mark, alone,
may not always determine relative strength. 22  Other factors may
be considered, such as the commercial strength or marketplace
recognition value of the mark,123 third party usage, 124 and common-
ality. 125
In analyzing the Strength of the Mark, the district court in Plus
applied the following test: "[a] term is suggestive if it requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the
nature of the goods. A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys
an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of
the goods." 126 The court stated that the word PLUS had merely an
everyday, dictionary meaning connoting something that is better
than average.27 Additionally, the court noted that the word PLUS
as a mark lacked originality and distinctiveness, and that there was
extensive third party usage (as evidenced by the more than 130
120. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.24[31 & n. 11 (quoting McGregor-Doniger,
Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc. 599 F.2d 1126, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also
supra note 77 (noting that many courts merge protectability with the Strength of Mark
factor).
121. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing protectability of a mark).
122. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.25. For instance, AMERICAN airlines
or FORD Motor cars may have been considered weak marks at first yet may have gained
in strength as marketplace recognition of the marks increased. Id. § 11.25, at 11-140.
123. This test evaluates the actual customer recognition value of the mark. Id. §
11.25, at 11-139 to 11-140.
124. When numerous sellers use similar marks, the distinctiveness between the marks
blurs; therefore, the more the mark is used by third parties, the less distinct it becomes.
See id. § 11.26[1], at 11-140 to 11-142.
125. Marks consisting of common words, such as ROYAL or ACME which are used
on numerous types of goods, tend to lose their distinctiveness and so are generally extend-
ed less protection than words such as KODAK or POLAROID. Id. § 11.26[2], at 11-142
to 11-143.
126. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 990 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
127. Id.
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cease and desist letters that Plus Products had sent). 128 According-
ly, the district court found that the mark was weak, which weighed
"slightly against [Plus] Products."'129
The Second Circuit, however, did not agree that the mark's
weakness weighed only slightly against Plus Products.130 The court
examined a number of related elements, including the originality
and uniqueness of the mark, and the extent of third party usage or
opposition proceedings.13 1 The Second Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that the mark was weak, but disagreed with
the district court's weighing of this factor. 132 The Second Circuit
instead concluded that, "the scope of protection accorded a weak
mark, like "PLUS" which is little more than self praise, will be
confined to competing products unless a convincing combination
of other Polaroid factors militates strongly in favor of likelihood
of confusion."'
' 33
128. Id. The court also noted that, in several opposition proceedings, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board had held that the mark was
weak. Id.; see also Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1307-08
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing descriptive versus suggestive marks).
129. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 991.
130. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1006.
131. Compare id. (where the court's consideration of these factors focused on the
mark itself in determining strength of mark) with Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing
Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991) (where, in determining strength of plaintiff's "New
Choice" mark, the court focused not only on third party usage and issues associated with
the mark itself, but also on issues associated with the plaintiff's business such as the
limited nature of plaintiff s business and its limited marketing) and Pump, Inc. v. Collins
Management, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (D. Mass. 1990) (where court held that the
"[plaintiff's] failure to get a record contract indicates that neither it nor the mark is well-
known in the music industry").
132. See Plus, 722 F.2d at 1005-06. ("When a mark is as weak as that of Products'
PLUS--comprised of an undistinctive word and coexisting with extensive third-party
usage-it is extremely unlikely that prudent customers will confuse it with similar marks
on non-competitive goods.") id. at 1006.
133. Id. For a discussion of non-competitive goods, see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
1, § 24.01-.03. The old rule was that there could only be infringement through use of a
similar mark on products in direct competition with those of the senior user. Id. at §
24.01[2]. The new rule gives the senior user protection of its mark on products which
"would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come from the same source, or
thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner." Id.
at § 24.03[2].
19951
204 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
2. Actual Confusion
Although evidence of actual consumer confusion is the best
indication of likelihood of confusion, there is no burden on the
plaintiff to prove actual confusion. 34 The overall test for determin-
ing infringement is the likelihood of confusion test, comprised of
several factors, of which actual confusion is but one of many con-
tributing components. 135 However, evidence indicating actual con-
fusion, while not a categorical requirement, can weigh in favor of
a finding of likelihood of confusion. 136  Additionally, in cases
where evidence indicating actual confusion is not readily attainable,
surveys of prospective customers may also be used as evidence of
actual confusion.137  Thus, evidence of actual confusion can be
presented in the form of testimony of individuals who were con-
fused by the similar marks or by prospective consumer surveys. 138
Courts, however, have been inconsistent in analyzing reported
instances or surveys of confusion. 39 For example, differences exist
134. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.02.
135. AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., I F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir.
1993).
136. See id. Conversely, a lack of any finding of actual confusion, while not dispos-
itive, may weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1006.
137. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.02[2][e]. But see id. ("[w]hile survey
evidence is sometimes said to be evidence of 'actual' confusion, it is so only to the extent
that the survey replicates the real world setting which can create an instance of actual
confusion") (footnotes omitted).
138. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.02. However, courts have re-
garded the findings of survey evidence with marked contrasts. See, e.g., infra notes 285-
88 and accompanying text. At least one court has stated that survey evidence is generally
extremely probative and that, moreover, on the occasion that the evidence may be flawed,
the jury should determine the relative weight to be given to the evidence:
While there will be occasions when the proffered survey is so flawed as to be
completely unhelpful to the trier of fact and therefore inadmissible, such situa-
tions will be rare .... [Alny shortcomings in the survey results go to the prop-
er weight of the survey and should be evaluated by the trier of fact.
AHP, 1 F.3d at 618 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
139. See Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal Trade-
mark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 19-20 (1994).
While most courts agree that actual confusion is one of the most important
factors ... they have displayed inconsistency in determining what evidence is
considered probative, substantial evidence of actual confusion. This problem
has been exacerbated by the failure of some courts to describe fully the evi-
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as to who must be confused1 40 and how much or what type of con-
fusion is sufficient. 141  The type of evidence and its veracity also
contribute to the weight of the evidence; the weight-must be deter-
dence being considered on this issue and, to explain why they find such evi-
dence to be either probative or non-probative of actual confusion.
id. at 20.
140. See Michael J. Allen, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under Federal Trade-
mark Law: Who Must be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321 (1991)
(noting that while "[many courts have properly stated, without analysis, that the infringe-
ment is based on the likelihood of confusion among purchasers and potential purchasers,"
other courts "have persisted in focusing on the purchaser at the time he makes his pur-
chasing decision, despite the fact that Congress in 1962 specifically deleted language in
the Lanham Act that limited actionable confusion to that of 'purchasers'). Id. at 322
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Compare In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (confusion
is to be considered with respect to end-users as well as actual purchasers) with Lang, 949
F.2d at 582-83 (the 400 phone calls plaintiff received from people inquiring about defen-
dant's company were not probative because there was no evidence that they were prospec-
tive customers and that their confusion had an effect on their purchasing decisions). See
also infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing Gillette, 984 F.2d at 574,
where company president testified that his friend was confused, the court held that the
evidence was not probative because there was no proof that the unnamed friend was a
prospective purchaser).
141. Surveys can be presented in various forms and can be applied to different
factors. They can be used, for instance, in determining the strength of a mark, as in the
case of so-called "association" surveys, which ask consumers to identify certain products
with marks. See, e.g., Quaker, 978 F.2d at 959 n.14. Or, they can be used in determining
actual confusion, to record the past impressions of identifiable consumers. See, e.g.,
Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1534-36 (10th
Cir. 1994). It is useful at this point in the discussion to momentarily set aside the distinc-
tion in order to demonstrate the discrepancies in the treatment of survey evidence amongst
the circuits.
Compare Quaker, 978 F.2d at 959 n.14 (holding that survey which asked consumers
to identify the phrase " is thirst aid" with a certain product was "precisely the sort
of study that this court has held to be the correct methodology for assessing consumer
confusion," id. at 960) with Universal, 22 F.3d at 1534-36 (where the court accepted
defendant's 2.6% rate of confusion over plaintiff's 22% rate, and found the 2.6%. rate to
be de minimis) and Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1311-12
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (where the plaintiffs survey showed 28% confusion and little "noise,"
and defendant's survey showed 20% confusion and greater "noise," the court stated that
it had to decide which one to accept and so rejected the plaintiff's survey altogether based
upon a potential shortcoming in the plaintiffs choice of a product in determining the
amount of noise). "Noise" is defined as "the inherent confusion in the market which
exists independently of and thus is not caused by confusion between the products being
tested." Id. at 1311.
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mined by analyzing the number of instances of actual confusion in
light of the number of opportunities for confusion. 142
In analyzing the Actual Confusion factor, the district court in
Plus held that the plaintiff's survey evidence was defective, and
that there was no evidence of actual confusion. 43  The Second
Circuit, acknowledging that it is difficult to establish actual confu-
sion in a retail context, held that the district court's finding that
there was no evidence at all of actual confusion during a three-year
period in which both companies had substantial sales, weighed
greatly against any likelihood of confusion.' 44 However, the Sec-
ond Circuit failed to acknowledge the. survey presented at the trial
level or to justify any reason for rejecting the evidence that the
plaintiff presented. 145 In arriving at this decision, neither the dis-
trict court nor the Second Circuit ever articulated a standard for
reviewing survey evidence. 46 They never addressed any guidelines
as to who must be confused, what type of information is needed to
prove confusion, or how much confusion there must be for it to be
significant. 147
3. Quality of the Product
There are two conflicting views regarding the Quality of Prod-
uct factor.148  Some courts have held that the more dissimilar the
142. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.02[2][b].
143. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 993. The district court held that because the survey was
directed to consumers within a close proximity to defendant's Foods' stores, and because
the questioning was formulated to lead the consumers to a certain answer, the probative
value of the survey was limited. Id. at 993 & n.7.
144. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1006.
145. Id. The Second Circuit even stated that the district court failed to articulate the
importance it gave to lack of actual confusion evidence, yet it never went on to suggest
a standard of its own. Id.
146. Neither the district court, in making its findings of fact in this area, nor the
Second Circuit, in reviewing the findings, ever articulated a standard for determining this
factor. Neither court addressed what type of evidence would have been deemed proba-
tive.
147. Although admittedly these questions as to the weight to be afforded to certain
types of evidence are difficult ones to answer and may be fact specific, courts often seem
to virtually ignore them. See, e.g., supra note 139; Universal, 22 F.3d 1527 (rejecting
evidence of a 22% finding of actual confusion by the plaintiff, without articulating any
standards).
148. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988)
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products' quality, the more damaging the confusion, because if a
high quality product is compared with a low quality product, it
could damage the reputation of the high quality product.14 9 Other
courts have reasoned that the more similar the quality of the prod-
ucts, the more damaging the confusion, because consumers are
more likely to be confused by similarities. 150
The Second Circuit, in Plus, took the latter approach and found
that such vast discrepancies in the quality of the products weighed
against any finding of likelihood of confusion: "the dissimilarity
between the goods as well as between the groups of consumers that
each party targets substantially lessens the likelihood of consumers'
misapprehending the source of either type of products."'' 1  The
court weighed this factor in favor of the defendant reasoning that
consumers are not likely to confuse goods which are of such polar
qualities. 152
4. Sophistication of the Buyers
The sophistication of the Buyers factor examines the amount of
care that the buyer could be expected to use in discerning between
the two similar marks. 53  The analysis takes into account "[t]he
general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the
normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the atten-
tion such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods..
• .,,4The Quality of Product factor, discussed immediately above,
("[Q]uality of the junior user's product, is the subject of some confusion.").
149. Id. at 78 ("One view is that an inferior quality product produced by the junior
user injures the senior user's reputation insofar as consumers might think that the source
of the inferior product is the senior user.").
150. Id. ("Another view is that a junior user's product of equal quality to a senior
user's product injures the senior user by the increased tendency of similar quality products
to promote consumer confusion.").
151. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007 (citing Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967
(2d Cir. 1981), Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 262 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980)); see also Banff, 841 F.2d at 492 (difference in quality de-
creases likelihood of confusion, while similarity in quality increases it).
152. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1006-07.
153. See generally, 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.27-.28.
154. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting 3 RUDoLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 81.2, at 577 (3d ed. 1969)).
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might also be considered in determining this factor. For example,
if goods or services are of a high quality and are relatively expen-
sive, the buyer is expected to be more discriminating, and is there-
fore less likely to be confused."'
This factor presents the one area in which the Second Circuit,
in Plus, sharply disagreed with the district court's evaluation and
balancing of the factors. The district court found that although
"[t]he buyer of vitamins and health foods is likely to be somewhat
discriminating and sophisticated, and is therefore unlikely to con-
fuse Foods' image with Products'," the trend towards healthier
lifestyles blurred. the distinction between health foods and regular
foods.156 The district court thus found the Sophistication of Buyers
factor unhelpful in the likelihood of confusion determination.
57
In contrast, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court
had undervalued the sophistication of the plaintiff's customers. 5
The Second Circuit, noting the contrast in images; marketing styles
and quality of goods between the two companies, found that, de-
spite the "blurring" between high quality health foods and regular
grocery store health items, sophisticated consumers of high quality
products could be expected to exercise greater care than the aver-
age consumer.15 1 "[S]ophisticated consumers may still be expected
155. See Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (N.D. I11.
1994) (holding that, when buying a $5 bottle of car wax, purchasers will exercise little
care so the likelihood of confusion increases; however, in buying a $5 bottle of wax to
be applied to an expensive car, purchasers are likely to exercise a greater degree of care,
thereby reducing the likelihood of confusion); see also AHP, I F.3d at 616 (holding that
when purchasing low cost items, consumers take less time and care, presumably increas-
ing the likelihood of confusion).
156. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 993.
157. See id.
158. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007.
159. id. Contra Shell, 992 F.2d at 1208-09 (where applicant attempted to register
a mark for automotive parts which was confusingly similar to registrant's mark for lube
and oil changes, the court held that the fact that the applicant's consumers could be
expected to use a high degree of care in picking automotive parts, did not mean that those
same consumers would use a similarly high level of care in purchasing oil change and
lube services). The Shell court based this reasoning on its finding that the relevant con-
sumers with respect to the applicant's automotive parts were the (professional) distribu-
tors, whereas the relevant consumers with respect to the oil changes were all potential
(retail) customers or users, who could not be held to as high a level of sophistication as
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to exercise greater care than most other shoppers . . . Under the
circumstances, it seems likely that sophisticated buyers will not be
confused in distinguishing Products' top-of-the-line merchandise
from Foods' discount stores and the low-cost brand-name goods
sold therein."' °
5. Good Faith
The asserted good faith of a defendant, or even evidence that
the junior user adopted a mark to accurately reflect its product, or
that it conducted a trademark search, or relied on the advice of
counsel, is not dispositive in determining the likelihood of [con-
sumer] confusion.' 61 For, in essence, "intent [of 'the junior user] is
largely irrelevant in determining if consumers likely will be con-
fused as to source."'' 62
Nonetheless, some reverse confusion decisions have equated a
junior user's good faith with a lack of intent, holding that a junior
user's lack of prior knowledge equals a lack of intent and therefore
weighs against a finding of infringement. 63  As noted previously
though, the very definition of reverse confusion dictates that intent
to pass off is not an issue in reverse confusion.' 64 Yet, many
courts still fail to recognize this, and liken the defendant's lack of
intent to trade on the good will of the plaintiff with good faith.
165
The Second Circuit, in Plus, did not address this issue at any
length, except that it did state how the finding of defendant's good
faith would be weighed: "Foods had a prior interest, economic and
the (professional) distributors. Id.
160. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007.
161. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.30-31.
162. Id. § 23.31[1] (emphasis added) (citation omitted). As one commentator has
stated: "[w]hat the defendant was thinking is poor evidence of what consumers were
likely to have been thinking." Id. § 23.32[1] (citing Perlman, The Restatement of the Law
of Unfair Competition: A Work in Progress, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 461, 472 (1990)).
163. See, e.g., Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d
1527, 1532 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 665 (1994); infra notes 283-84 and ac-
companying text; W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 575, 567 (2d Cir.
1993); infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
165. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.30[2], at 23-194 ("some modem decisions
cling to the fiction that wrongful intent is necessary").
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historical, in the use of the word "PLUS" in its special type of food
retailing. Accordingly, [the district court] correctly found that there
was no bad faith on the part of Foods in using the mark-a factor
to be weighed in determining injunctive relief."' 66
6. Similarity of the Marks
Assessment of the Similarity of Marks involves a number of
variables: color and physical appearance, typeset, design and over-
all packaging, the specific words used as part of the mark, place-
ment of the words, and use of other descriptive words or brand
names in conjunction with the mark. 167 It is the overall impression
of a mark that is important in determining this factor. 16' However,
courts disagree as to whether the marks are to be viewed separately
or together. 69
The Second Circuit in Plus held that, while Products and Foods
each used the word "PLUS" written in similar scripts, the overall
design of the logos was different, as was the overall packaging
effect of the two goods. 170 The court thus found only a slight pos-
sibility of confusion presented by the similarity of the marks. 17 1
7. Proximity of the Products
The Proximity of the Products factor examines the extent to
which products with similar marks compete with each other. 72 If
166. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
167. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.04, at 23-48 (describing the
analysis of the similarity factor as a comparison of "the overall impression created by the
designations; pronunciation; translation of foreign words; and verbal translation of pic-
tures; suggestions, connotations or meanings of the designations") (citing Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 21(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990)).
168. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007; see also Banff, 841 F.2d at 492.
169. Compare Banff, 841 F.2d at 492 (the proper test is whether the labels create the
same impression when viewed separately) and Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co.,
732 F. Supp. 1417, 1439 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (the court must refrain from side-by-side
comparisons) with Turtle Wax, 869 F. Supp. at 1309 (a side-by-side comparison is proper
when the goods are sold side-by-side).
170. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007. While both logos were in a similar script, Foods' logo
"PLUS" was used as an acronym for Priced-Low-U-Save and was in a blue and orange
outline, while Products' "PLUS" logo consisted of a white "+" sign within a red circle
in the center of the "P". Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 991.
171. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1007.
172. See Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir.
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the products are within the same class, serve the same purpose or
are used in conjunction with one another, similar marks are more
likely to cause confusion. 17
3
The district court regarded the essential issue as: "whether the
nature of the products and the structure of the relevant markets is
such that consumers are likely to perceive the goods in question as
emanating from a common source."174  Given the prevalence of
diversification and mass merchandising in the modem market, the
district court concluded the public could likely connect two com-
plementary goods as emanating from the same source. 75 The dis-
trict court acknowledged the subjectivity involved in making such
a determination, 176 as well as the resulting need to look at the dif-
ferent modes in which the parties products are sold,177 and ultimate-
ly found the proximity of the goods to be of slight importance in
Plus.1
78
1991).
173. Id.; see also Turtle Wax, 869 F. Supp. at 1307 (where the defendant adopted a
mark for car wax in direct competition with plaintiffs car wax and sold through the same
channels of trade, the court held that such proximity diminished the amount of similarity
required between the marks to establish confusion).
174. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 991. Compare Shell, 992 F.2d at 1207 (where registrant
sold automotive parts to distributors and applicant sold oil changes and lubricant services
to consumers, consumers could conceivably assume a common source) with Lang, 949
F.2d at 582 (where plaintiff's "New Choices Press" sold books and tapes on charisma and
defendant published a retirement magazine, "New Choices for the Best Years," no prox-
imity found, even though both were in the field of publishing).
175. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 991-92.
176. The court cited a number of cases to demonstrate that the determination is fact-
specific. Id. at 992-93. Compare Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1945) (finding proximity and recognizing that there could be an expectation on the
part of the buying public that the business of a food manufacturer and a vitamin manufac-
turer were significantly proximate in that a consumer could reasonably expect that a
manufacturer or distributor of "V-8" vegetable juice might also make or distribute "V-8"
vitamins) with Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding
only a slight proximity between BRAVO corn chips and BRAVO crackers because the
taste and preparation of the products varied and the two products were sold within dif-
ferent sections of the supermarkets) and Buitoni Foods Corp. v. Gio. Buton & C. S.p.A.,
680 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding only slight proximity between table wine,
brandies, liqueurs and aperitifs because there were different alcohol contents and uses).
177. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 992-93.
178. Id. at 993.
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The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that
the two companies' "Plus" goods were proximate, yet disagreed
with the district court's conclusion that the proximity of the goods
was of prime importance. 179 The Second Circuit held instead that
countervailing indicators made the proximity factor insignificant.18
Specifically, the Second Circuit focused on three issues: (1) that
the Plus Products' line was segregated in supermarkets, and was
not sold at all in Discount Foods' stores; 181 (2) that the marketing
approaches of the two differed; 8 2 and (3) that Plus Products' cus-
tomers were interested in high. quality, as opposed to Discount
Foods' customers, who were primarily interested in a bargain. 83
The Second Circuit thus concluded that "[t]he differences in modes
of marketing and the segregation of Products' merchandise renders
the slight proximity of the parties' products insignificant." 184
8. Bridging the Gap
The Bridging the Gap factor refers to two separate possibilities:
(1) that the senior user of the mark will expand its production base
into the product area for which the junior user has adopted the
mark; or (2) that, even if the senior user does not intend to expand,
the products are close enough that consumers will nonetheless as-
sume that they emanate from the same source.'85
179. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1008.
180. Id.
181. Id. ("[The degree of proximity between the two products in the food sections
of retail stores is relevant only insofar as it bears on the likelihood of confusion and gives
the impression that non-competing goods are from the same origin." (citing McGregor-
Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2d Cir. 1979))).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.05[3][b] at 24-35. In outlining the two
possibilities, McCarthy'cited from Lambda Electronics:
In the likelihood of confusion context, "bridging the gap" refers to two distinct
possibilities. The first is that the senior user presently intends to expand his
sales efforts to compete directly with the junior user; likelihood of confusion is
created by the likelihood that the two products will be directly competitive.
The second possibility is that, while there is no present intention to bridge the
gap, consumers will assume otherwise and conclude, in this era of corporate
diversification, that the parties are related companies.
Id. (quoting Lambda Elects. Corp. v. Lambda Technology, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 211
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The district court, in Plus, noted that Richardson-Vicks, the par-
ent company of the plaintiff Plus Products, was an aggressive mer-
chandiser and that, ,because the line between health food products
and conventional food items was ill-defined, Plus Products might
well bridge the gap into conventional food items.18 6 The Second
Circuit agreed to an extent, but also noted that the defendant, Dis-
count Foods, ran a brand-name discount store, and that even if Plus
Products was to-sell conventional food items, it would in all proba-
bility carry on the tradition of offering only -high quality items.
187
The court thus concluded that, although Plus Products might at-
tempt to bridge the gap into Plus Discounts' product market, such
an event would not be likely to cause confusion.' Even if the
companies were to sell competing goods, they would each maintain
their polar images and marketing standards such that the quality of
the products would still be dissimilar and the potentially slight
proximity of the products would remain insignificant.
1 8 9
9. Summing Up the Polaroid Factors in Plus Products
The Second Circuit in Plus found a weak mark,' 9° no actual
confusion, 9 ' dissimilarity between the quality of the goods, 92 so-
U.S.P.Q. 75, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
186. Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 989; see also Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732
F. Supp. 1417, 1450 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (where the plaintiff made a similar argument). The
plaintiff there, Worthington Foods, first used the "HEARTWISE" mark in conjunction
with its Morningstar Farms frozen food breakfast items, including frozen meats and eggs.
Id. at 1424-26. Kellogg subsequently began using a similar "Heartwise" mark in market-
ing a breakfast cereal. Id. at 1426. Worthington argued that because it had signed a
letter of intent to buy a health food company which made breakfast cereal, and because
Kellogg was already selling frozen Eggo waffles, there was a strong possibility that either
one of the parties might expand its line of products to include an item which would
compete directly with an existing product of the other company. Id. at 1450. The court
found, however, that Worthington's plans to expand were merely speculative and that
Kellogg provided no evidence of plans to manufacture meat analogue or egg substitute
goods nor to use the mark "Heartwise" in conjunction with frozen breakfast foods. Id.
at 1450-51.
187. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1008.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See discussion supra part III.B.1.
191. See discussion supra part III.B.2.
192. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
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phistication of Plus Products' buyers,' 93 no bad faith on the part of
Discount Foods, 194 only a slight similarity of the marks,' 95 an insig-
nificant proximity of the goods, 196 and a low probability that any
attempts by Plus Products' to bridge the gap would cause confu-
sion. 197 In essence, the only factors that weighed, even remotely,
in Plus Products' favor were a slight similarity of the marks and a
low probability of bridging the gap. After weighing the likelihood
of confusion factors, the Second Circuit held that Plus Products'
injunction should be limited to the three overlapping goods.' 98
Although the Second Circuit was progressive in making this
determination, the analysis nonetheless had its own shortcomings,
affording more attention to some factors than to others, and leaving
some gaps. As a result, courts in subsequent cases started filling
in the gaps, but again, these courts were doing so almost as a mat-
ter of first impression, and so, in essence, were each setting their
own standards. In fact, even the Second Circuit itself seemed to
vary the analysis of the factors in subsequent cases.
C. Additional Case Law
1. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co.
Nine years after the Plus decision, the Second Circuit decided
another reverse confusion case, W. W. W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.
v. Gillette Co.'99 In 1981, W.W.W. Pharmaceutical ("WWW")
purchased both the formula for "Sportstick" lip balm and its prede-
cessor's interest in the trademark.2°° One year later, WWW began
selling the lip balm and received a federal registration for the
mark.20 ' The lip balm, packaged in a blue tube with white letter-
193. See discussion supra part III.B.4.
194. See discussion supra part III.B.5.
195. See discussion supra part III.B.6.
196. See discussion supra part III.B.7.
197. See discussion supra part III.B.8.
198. Plus, 722 F.2d at 1008-09. The three overlapping goods consisted of pet foods,
spices, and food oils. Id. The court also held that the disclaimers proposed by the district
court were unnecessary. Id. at 1009.
199. 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1993).
200. Id. at 569. WWW's predecessor in interest, Rumby Int'l, had applied for
federal registration in 1981. Id.
201. Id. The Federal Registration, applied for by Rumby Int'l, was issued to WWW
on May 11, 1982. Id.
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ing, was sold primarily at check out counters and point of sale
displays in retail stores.202 WWW's "Sportstick" sales were erratic,
peaking in 1985 with $233,267 in gross sales nationwide. 20 3
Gillette, who had manufactured deodorant under the Right
Guard name since 1959, decided in late 1986 or early 1987 to
launch a new Right Guard product in order to appeal to the more
active consumer. 2°4 In 1988, after successful test surveys, Gillette
launched its new deodorant, in solid stick form as well as in tradi-
tional aerosol form, and named it "Sport Stick., 20 5 Gillette's in-
house counsel had conducted a search for the terms "Sport" and
"GS Sportsline," and came up with over 60 marks, including
WWW's "Sportstick" mark for lip balm.2°  Gillette nonetheless
began marketing the product nationally, using well-known athletes
and advertising during such prime time shows as "Monday Night
Football. 20 7 WWW subsequently contacted Gillette, contesting the
use of the mark, and when Gillette failed to respond, WWW filed
suit for infringement of its federally registered mark for lip balm.
208
WWW alleged that Gillette's use of the term "Sport Stick" con-
fused WWW's potential customers and caused them to assume that
Gillette's "Sport Stick" mark for deodorant was the source of
WWW's "Sportstick" mark for lip balm.2°9 In sum, WWW
claimed reverse confusion-that consumers would believe that it
was WWW, the senior user, who was infringing on Gillette's
mark.2
10
The Second Circuit first sought to determine Strength of the
Mark, setting out two tests: (1) the degree to which the mark is in-
herently distinctive; and (2) the degree to which it is distinctive in
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. id. at 569-70.
206. Id. at 569.
207. Id. at 570.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 571. WWW claimed trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
1114, as well as false designation of origin, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1125(a). Id. at 570.
Only the claim for the former will be discussed herein, although, in order to prove either
claim, there must be a showing of likelihood of confusion. Id. at 570-71.
210. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 571.
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the marketplace. 2" Applying the first test, the Second Circuit not-
ed that the combination of the words "sport" and "stick" into one
mark required some imagination, and held that the "Sportstick"
mark was suggestive, rather than merely descriptive.2 2  It then
noted that a finding of suggestiveness alone did not determine
strength, and proceeded with the second test, analyzing the mark's
213secondary meaning. In considering this secondary meaning,
however, the court looked to the senior user's sales figures, not to
any objective evidence of actual recognition by consumers, and
transferred those sales figures into a conclusion about the strength
of the mark.21 4 The court noted WWW's modest sales figures, and
concluded that "[t]his evidence indicates a low national recognition
of WWW's product., 21
5
Under the Similarity of the Marks factor, the Second Circuit
took much the same approach as it did in Plus, analyzing the prod-
ucts' overall impression as viewed by the sizes, logos, typefaces,
and package designs, and determined that the marks themselves
were not confusingly similar, despite the similar names.2 6 , It also
found that the Proximity of Products factor was insignificant 27 and
211. Id. at 572 (citing McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131-
33 (2d Cir. 1979)).
212. Id. (quoting W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., v. Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013,
1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
213. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 572-73. But see supra note 73 (secondary meaning is only
required when a mark is descriptive, not when a mark is suggestive).
214. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573.
215. Id.
216. Id. The court pointed out as distinguishing factors the diminutive size of
"sport" and "stick" for most of Gillette's advertising and the separation of the two words
in Gillette's mark by a running figure as well as Gillette's use of the brand name Right
Guard immediately preceding "Sport Stick" and in bigger letters. Id. Compare id. (fo-
cusing on the use of brand name Right Guard in conjunction with the mark decreases the
likelihood of confusion) with Banff, 841 F.2d at 492 (holding that, rather than offsetting
the mark's similarity, the presence of defendant Bloomingdale's name in conjunction with
its "B-wear" mark may increase misappropriation of plaintiff's "Bee Wear" mark by
linking defendant's name with plaintiff's good will).
217. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573-74. The court noted here that, in determining the
proximity of products, the proper analysis is to determine whether the two products
compete with each other, whether they "serve the same purpose, fall within the same
general class, or are used together .. " Id. at 573 (citing Lang, 949 F.2d at 582). It
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that the plaintiff, WWW, presented no evidence of an intention to
expand its product line, to Bridge the Gap.218
As evidence of Actual Confusion, WWW's president offered
testimony that on two separate occasions he had conversations with
people who confused the source of origin of WWW's product with
that of Gillette' S.219 The court dismissed the testimony with respect
to the first person who was reportedly confused, because there was
no evidence that the person was a potential purchaser or that his
reported confusion affected his purchasing decision. 220 The court
cited the Eleventh Circuit, which had previously discounted similar
testimony because the confused persons were not identified as po-
tential customers and did not testify at trial.221
In analyzing the Good Faith factor, the Second Circuit noted
that Gillette had selected a name which matched the image of its
product, had performed a trademark search, and had relied on the
advice of counsel.222 Thus, the court concluded, given this "good
faith effort" shown by Gillette, WWW failed to put forth any evi-
dence that Gillette intended to promote confusion.223 The Second
Circuit placed the burden on the senior user to prove bad faith on
the part of the second user, and the court focused on whether the
second user intended to capitalize on the plaintiff's good will.
224
The Second Circuit then went even further and concluded that,
"[g]iven Gillette's name recognition and good will, and WWW's
obscurity, any confusion would have redounded to the plaintiff's,
acknowledged that the two were both generally characterized as personal care products,
and that they shared some of the same channels of trade; however, ultimately the court
concluded that because the products were displayed in different sections of stores, the
proximity factor was not of overriding importance. Id. at 573-74.
218. Id. at 574.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Freedom Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Way,757 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985)).
222. Id. at 575.
223. Id. But see supra note 62 (discussing Big 0 Tire, 561 F.2d at 1372 (intent is
irrelevant)); infra note 265 (discussing Quaker, 978 F.2d at 960-61 (same)).
224. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575.
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rather than the defendant's, benefit., 225  In essence, the Second
Circuit said that, assuming arguendo Gillette did infringe upon
WWW's trademark, Gillette's large advertising expenditures could
only serve to benefit WWW's business by association. 26
2. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.
In 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the same
court that had rejected the notion of reverse confusion in Westward
Manufacturing,227 addressed the "THIRST-AID" case, Sands,
Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,2  levying damages against
Quaker Oats for its infringing use of the mark "THIRST-AID. 229
In 1980 STW, then owner of the mark "THIRST-AID," entered
into a licensing agreement with Pet, Inc., whereby Pet used the
mark "THIRST-AID" to test market an isotonic beverage which
was intended to compete directly with Gatorade and to be adver-
tised through the same channels.2 30 Pet test-marketed the beverage,
capturing 25% of the market in the test area,23 but never pursued
that beverage, and its right to use the mark expired in 198 1.232
However, in 1981, STW sold the assets of Middleby Inc. to L.
Karp & Sons,233 and, based upon Pet's prior successes in testing its
product, 234 Karp subsequently hired a consultant for the purpose of
licensing the mark, "THIRST-AID," for use in connection with a
beverage.35 Within that same time period, however, Gatorade had
225. Id.
226. Id.; see also Kellogg, 732 F. Supp. at 1456 (stating that, despite confusingly
similar marks, the confusion caused by Kellogg's large advertising budget could serve to
benefit the plaintiff). But see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
227. See Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968); see also supra part I.B.1.
228. 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1879 (1993).
229. id. at 963.
230. id. at 950.
231. Id.
232. ld.
233. Id. at 950.
234. ld. at 958-59.
235. Id. at 956. At some time between 1981 and 1984, Karp's consultant contacted
two well-known beverage companies, Shasta and Tropicana, to attempt to license the
mark. Id.
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started using its own "Thirst-Aid" mark.236
In March of 1984, Quaker Oats presented its Gatorade "Thirst
Aid" campaign to its in-house counsel, Charles Lannin, who initial-
ly concluded that there could be no infringement because Quaker
was using the words "Thirst Aid" in a descriptive manner, to de-
scribe the attributes of the product.237 When two employees of
Quaker subsequently informed Lannin of the test-marketing of
Pet's "THIRST-AID" beverage,238 he nonetheless conducted a
search of the mark and found the three "THIRST-AID" marks
registered by Middleby, as well as the subsequent transfer to
Karp.239 A Quaker representative then contacted Karp, whose em-
ployee said that he did not think Karp, Inc. marketed anything
under that name anymore. 240 Counsel Lannin reiterated that, re-
gardless of the use of the mark by Karp, there was no infringement
because "THIRST-AID" was merely descriptive. 241 However, STW
offered a letter from the Chief Operating Officer of Tropicana to
Karp as evidence that Karp's efforts to market a beverage product
similar to Pet's isotonic beverage was thwarted by Gatorade's use
of the mark:
"Thirst Aid" as a brand name is right on strategy. Howev-
er, protection of this trademark may be difficult, as I have
recently seen Gatorade TV spots using Thrist [sic] Aid su-
perimposed on the screen with the tag, "Gatorade is Thirst
Aid." If we were to pursue this at a later date, we would
require trademark protection, as "Thirst Aid" is a key ele-
ment offered in the proposal. 242
STW, who still owned the rights to use the mark under a li-
censing back agreement with Karp, informed Quaker that Quaker
was infringing on those rights.243 Under an assignment back from
236. Id. at 950.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 951.
242. Id. at 959 n.13 (alteration in original).
243. id. at 951.
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Karp, STW then reacquired all rights to the mark and filed suit.2"
The district court held for STW on the issue of trademark in-
fringement, and awarded STW 10% of Quaker's (pre-tax) profits
from using "Thirst-Aid" in its Gatorade advertising.245 The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of infringe-
ment, but remanded on the issue of damages. 46 In its decision, the
Seventh Circuit noted that Karp's efforts to license the mark might
have been successful, had Gatorade not launched its "Thirst Aid"
campaign.
247
The Seventh Circuit's approach to this case differed from the
Second Circuit's approach in Plus Products and Gillette. Before
addressing the likelihood of confusion test, the Seventh Circuit
launched into a discussion of Quaker's allegation that STW was
misappropriating a merely "descriptive" mark by using the term as
a trademark. 248 The court found that, even though "THIRST-AID"
was not "descriptive" by virtue of a common meaning, it was none-
theless descriptive rather than suggestive, because it did not require
a lot of imagination to link it with "First Aid" or lemonade and a
.244. Id.
245. Id. at 951 (citing Sands, Taylor & Wood v. The Quaker Oats Co., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1990 WL 251914 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).
246. See Quaker, 978 F.2d at 961-64 (discussing the issue of damages). The district
court awarded the plaintiff $24 million in damages, 10% of the $240 million profit real-
ized by Quaker. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1990 WL 251914 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's award of $24 million in profits reasoning that
it was a windfall and that the appropriate amount of damages should be commensurate
to the amount defendant would have had to pay to obtain licensing from the plaintiff.
978 F.2d at 963. The concurring opinion agreed with the majority that a 10% royalty was
too speculative, but argued that compensatory damages alone, as suggested by the majori-
ty, were insufficient and that there should have been more emphasis placed on deterrence
as consistent with the finding of bad faith on the part of the defendant. Id. at 963-64
(Ripple, J., concurring). Conversely, the dissent argued that because there was a finding
of bad faith and because under the district court's measure of damages the defendant
would still realize 90% of the profits (or $216 million), 10% was not an unreasonable
amount to award the plaintiff. Id. at 964 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). Despite the Seventh
Circuit's determination that some quantum of damages was appropriate, the case has been
remanded numerous times for recalculation of damages. See 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7893
(N.D. I11. June 8, 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir.
1994), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 44 F.3d 579 (1995).
247. Quaker, 978 F.2d at 958-59.
248. Id. at 951-54.
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product that quenches thirst.249 Concluding that the term was mere-
ly "descriptive," the court noted that even a descriptive term may
be protectable as a trademark, to the extent that it has developed
secondary meaning.5 ,
After determining that the "THIRST AID" mark could be wor-
thy of protection, the Seventh Circuit next analyzed the reverse
confusion claim and the likelihood of confusion factors.25 The
first issue it addressed was Bridging the Gap, noting that this was
one of the most important considerations in a reverse confusion
case, because, without it, the senior user would not be able to capi-
talize on its mark and move into new product markets. 252 The
court set forth as a compelling reason for protecting the trademark
the need to "protect the owner's ability to enter product markets in
which it does not now trade but into which it might reasonably be
expected to expand in the future. ' '253 Consequently, the court held
that it was a distinct possibility that, following Pet's test market of
its isotonic beverage, Karp would have been successful in licensing
the "THIRST-AID" mark for use on an isotonic beverage.254 Ac-
knowledging that the plaintiff, STW, had contacted companies such
as Tropicana and Shasta in an attempt to market its isotonic bever-
age and capitalize on its "THIRST-AID" label, the court stated:
249. Id. at 953.
250. Id. at 953-54.
251. Id. at 958-61. The test used by this court analyzed the following 7 factors:
1)1 the degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion
2) the similarity of the products for which the name is used
3) the areas and manner of concurrent use
4), the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers
5) the strength of the complainant's mark
6) actual confusion
7) an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those
of another.
Id. at 959 (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 958 (referring to this factor as the plaintiff's ability to expand into product
markets).
253. Id. (citing Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 464'(3d Cir. 1983)).
254. See id. at 958-59. Prior to the licensing of the mark to Pet for use in its test
market, the mark was used on ice cream toppings, and beverage products and syrups sold
to food service establishments. Id. at 949-50.
1995]
222 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Protecting the trademark owner's interest in capitalizing on
the good will associated with its mark by moving into new
markets is especially compelling in the context of a reverse
confusion case, where the junior user so overwhelms the
senior user's mark that the senior user may come to be seen
as the infringer. Such a scenario is particularly likely if the
senior user were to attempt to expand into the precise field
where the junior user has created a strong association be-
tween its product and the senior user's mark. "When it ap-
pears extremely likely . . . that the trademark owner will
soon enter the defendant's field, this . .. factor weighs
heavily in favor of injunctive relief., 255
Because the senior user could prove its prior efforts to license its
mark and capitalize on its product, the court viewed this as evi-
dence that the senior user planned to bridge the gap, and that it
could conceivably have moved into the isotonic beverage market.25
6
The court then took a new approach with respect to the
Strength of Mark factor. Noting that the defendant had adopted a
mark virtually identical to the plaintiff's for a product in direct
competition, the court stated that "[w]hether a mark is weak or not
is of little importance where the conflicting mark is identical and
the goods are closely related. 257 The court then suggested that, in
a reverse confusion context, the Strength of Mark factor should be
examined in light of its association with the junior user's mark,
rather than that of the senior user.25' The court supported this
proposition by citing to the plaintiffs evidence that Gatorade had
255. Id. at 958 (quoting Interpace, 721 F.2d at 464).
256. Id. at 958-59.
257. Id. at 959 (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.24, at 505-06).
258. See id.
In a reverse confusion case, then, it may make more sense to consider the
strength of the mark in terms of its association with the junior user's goods.
Here, there was abundant evidence that consumers strongly associate the words
"thirst aid" with Gatorade, even when those words appear on a product label
along with a different brand name.
Id. The court also cited a study presented by STW's expert which supported this proposi-
tion. Id. at 959 n.14. But see supra note 115 (citing original Polaroid factors, basing
Strength of the Mark factor on strength of senior user's mark).
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such a strong association with the words "Thirst Aid" that consum-
ers surveyed associated the words "Thirst Aid" with the Gatorade
product even if the words were used in conjunction with a different
product or on a different label.259 In supporting this proposition,
the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion
that the survey was not probative of confusion.2 °  Instead, the
Seventh Circuit found that the Pet product used in the survey fairly
represented the isotonic beverage that Pet would have introduced
into the marketplace but for Quaker's infringement, and concluded
that the survey was probative of confusion.261
With respect to the Intent factor, the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the question of intent to pass off is insignificant in re-
verse confusion262 and held that the district court erred in consider-
ing Quaker's intent.263 The court reasoned that intent of the junior
user to trade on the good will of the senior user is irrelevant be-
cause, in a reverse confusion case the defendant, by definition, is
not palming off:
Even in a traditional case of forward confusion the defen-
dant's intent is relevant to the issue of likelihood of confu-
sion only if he intended 'to palm off his products as those
of another,' thereby profiting from confusion . . .. In a
reverse confusion case, of course, the defendant by defini-
tion is not palming off or otherwise attempting to create
confusion as to the source of his product. Thus, the 'intent'
factor of the likelihood of confusion analysis is essentially
irrelevant in a reverse confusion case.264
259. See Quaker, 978 F.2d at 959-60 & n.14. The plaintiff presented survey evi-
dence that 1) 79.2% of the 375 consumers surveyed filled in the blank in the phrase
" _ is thirst aid," with the word "Gatorade," and 2) that 24% of the customers who
were shown the label that Pet used when test-marketing its own isotonic beverage thought
that the product was associated with Gatorade. Id.
260. Id. at 960. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion
that the survey failed to expose the consumer to a product which could be found in the
marketplace and thus was not probative. Id.
261. Id. Contra Universal, 22 F.3d at 1534-36; infra notes 285-88.
262. Quaker, 978 F.2d at 960.
263. Id. at 960-61.
264. Id. at 961 (citation omitted) (first and third emphases added).
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The Seventh Circuit concluded by confirming the district court's
overall finding that there was infringement, but remanding on the
issue of damages.265
3. Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co.
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit, the same court which had first ac-
knowledged reverse confusion in 1978, heard another reverse con-
fusion case and this time held for the defendant. In'Universal
Money Centers, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,266
the plaintiff Universal Money Centers ("UMC") established elec-
ironic banking services in 1981, and registered four trademarks for
plastic electronic banking cards, all with derivations of the mark
"UNIVERSAL. 267 UMC's cards could be used to purchase certain
retail goods and services, to access selected insurance products, and
to obtain cash from ATM machines operated by UMC or by those
organizations which were associated with UMC. 268
Nine years later, in March 1990, AT&T, introduced its combi-
nation telephone and retail credit card, the "AT&T Universal
Card," in a television commercial during the Academy Awards.269
The card was affiliated with Visa and MasterCard and could be
used as a credit card, a phone card, or as a bank card. 270 A year
after the introduction of its card, AT&T had already spent over $60
million in advertising and marketing, and less than four years later,
AT&T had more than 10,000,000 cardholders, as opposed to
UMC's 160,000 cardholders. 27' However, UMC and AT&T were
not affiliated, and AT&T cardholders could not use their cards to
obtain cash from UMC's ATM machines.272
265. Id. at 961-63.
266. 22 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 665 (1994).
267. Id. at 1528.
268. Id. Universal had an association with American Express, Discover, Cirrus and
BankMate. id.
269. Id. at 1528-29.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1528; see also Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,
797 F. Supp. 891 (D. Kan. 1992).
272. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1529.
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Certain UMC executives saw the initial broadcast advertisement
for the "AT&T Universal card," and UMC subsequently filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin AT&T from using the
mark "UNIVERSAL., 273  The district court denied the plaintiffs
motion274 and, finding that UMC failed to establish likelihood of
confusion between its "Universal" ATM card and AT&T's combi-
nation telephone/credit card, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T.275
The Tenth Circuit was divided, however, with respect to the
evidence presented.276 The majority held for the defendant and
found no likelihood of confusion,277 while the dissent opposed the
majority's decision to grant the motion for summary judgment in
light of the conflicting evidence presented by each side.278
With respect to the Similarity of the Marks, the court found
that, even though both marks used the word "Universal," and so
273. Id. UMC based its preliminary injunction on trademark infringement pursuant
to 15 U.S.C.§ 1114(1), false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. §1125(a), and unfair
competition under state common law. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1536.
276. Id. at 1534.
277. Id. at 1536. The factors considered by the Tenth Circuit were:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark or trade
name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services
marketed by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Id. at 1530 (citing Jordache Enters. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th
Cir. 1987)).
The Universal court also stated that, "'[t]his list is not exhaustive. All of the factors
are interrelated, and no one factor is dispositive,'. . . evidence of actual confusion and the
strength. or weakness of UMC's trademarks are two additional relevant factors." Id.
(citing Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484).
278. Id. at 1538 (Ebel, J., dissenting). Judge Ebel disagreed with the majority and,
applying the same summary judgment standard as the majority, found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see also infra notes 288-90.
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were phonetically identical, the differences in the lettering styles,
logos, and coloring schemes gave different overall impressions.279
In addition, the majority held that there was never any intent on the
part of AT&T to trade on the good will of UMC; 280 and further,
that the reported instances of actual confusion were de minimis.281
In analyzing the Good Faith factor, the majority focused on wheth-
er AT&T intended to derive a benefit from UMC's good will:
"'[tihe proper focus [remains] whether defendant had the intent to
derive benefit from the reputation or goodwill of plaintiff ...
[T]here are absolutely no facts to support an inference that AT&T
adopted the word 'Universal' with the intent to derive benefit from
UMC's marks. 2 2 However, in focusing on intent, the Tenth Cir-
cuit quoted from a direct confusion case, Jordache, as authority,
failing to recognize the precedent of other reverse confusion cases
which acknowledged that intent to pass off is irrelevant in a reverse
confusion analysis.283
The majority decided that UMC's report of actual confusion
was de minimis, even though UMC had presented evidence that
22% of the AT&T cardholders who were contacted had tried to use
their AT&T card in a UMC machine.284 UMC also testified that
this 22% rate of confusion was 4.5 times the normal rate of confu-
sion among ATM card users in general.285 On the other hand,
279. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1531. But see Shell, 992 F.2d at 1206 (where words
"RIGHT-A-WAY" were used in both marks, even differences in script and arrow design
did not diminish their similarity when viewed as a whole, because the words themselves
dominated the marks).
280. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1531-32.
281. Id. at 1535.
282. Id. at 1532 (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485) (second alteration in original).
283. See id. But see Quaker, 978 F.2d at 961 (intent to pass off is irrelevant in
reverse confusion); supra text accompanying note 265 (same).
284. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1535. But see Shell, 992 F.2d at 1207 (where registrant
argued that because applicant had a relatively small customer base the rate of confusion
would only be de minimis, the court rejected the argument, reasoning that the Lanham Act
accords prima facie exclusive rights to all trademark holders, regardless of their size).
285. See Universal, 22 F.3d at 1538-40 (Ebel, J., dissenting). UMC presented evi-
dence that, within a nine month time period, in a limited area, 400 AT&T cardholders
attempted to use their Universal cards in UMC's machines. Id. at 1539. Moreover, UMC
submitted affidavits that 14 of the 64 AT&T cardholders interviewed in a phone survey
(or 22%) attempted to use the card in a UMC machine because they were confused by
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AT&T testified that when surveying cardholders to determine
whether they were confused or had tried to use one card in the
other's machine, its survey yielded only a 2.6% rate of confu-
286sion. The majority apparently dismissed UMC's showing of a
22% rate of confusion and held instead that "UMC's failure to
sufficiently rebut AT & T's [sic] preliminary showing of no signifi-
cant actual confusion in the marketplace ... *convinces us that a
'reasonable jury could [not] return a verdict for [UMC].1287
The dissenting judge, Judge Ebel, criticized the majority's ap-
plication of the summary judgment standard and posited that UMC
had presented sufficient evidence of actual confusion to present a
genuine issue of material fact, such that the jury could have found
in favor of the non-moving party, UMC. 288 Judge Ebel noted that
the Universal mark, and that AT&T cardholders are 4.5 more times likely to use their
card in a UMC machine than any other ATM users. Id.
286. Id. In answer to UMC's survey, AT&T presented evidence that, of the 400
AT&T cardholders that attempted to use their cards in UMC's machines, only 2.6% of
them were confused by the similar Universal marks. Id. In addition, AT&T attempted
to dismiss UMC's showing of a 22% rate of confusion by presenting AT&T cardholders
as witnesses who testified that they attempted to use their cards in UMC machines only
because it was an ATM machine and they did not know of (or did not pay attention to)
the differences in ATM machines. Id. at 1534-35.
287. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1535. But see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.02[2][a]
("Any evidence of actual confusion is strong proof of the fact of a likelihood of confu-
sion. No matter how convinced a trial judge may be of the absence of any likelihood of
confusion, he or she must at least listen to evidence presented of actual confusion.")
(footnotes omitted). Note that the Universal court also dismissed the issue of UMC's
repeated requests for discovery and a list of AT&T's accounts with phone numbers so that
they could be contacted for its survey. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1539-40. Even though the
court granted UMC a motion to compel discovery in order to obtain information necessary
to conduct its own survey, the order was never enforced and was then declared moot
because the court assumed that the survey would likely produce evidence that the AT&T
cardholders questioned had never attempted to use their cards at UMC's ATMs. Id. at
1540.
288. Id. at 1538-39 (Ebel, J., dissenting). Judge Ebel criticized the majority's deci-
sion to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment in light of the conflicting
evidence presented, stating that, the evidence presented by the plaintiff was such that,
when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find in
the plaintiffs favor. Id. at 1538 (Ebel, J., dissenting). Judge Ebel went on to say that,
"[a]t a minimum, these affidavits call into question [the defendant's expert's] results and
clearly raise a material issue of fact that should have been resolved by a jury .... It is
the jury who should weigh the evidence rather than a judge on a summary judgment
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the cards were significantly similar in that they both emphasized
the word "Universal," and that UMC had bolstered the evidence of
similarity of marks with empirical evidence in the form of surveys
289and expert testimony. Moreover, according to the dissent, neither
the majority nor the defendant AT&T offered any explanation for
the conflicting evidence nor provided any standard to be used in
analyzing evidence of actual confusion.2 ° Ironically it was the
Tenth Circuit, the first circuit to acknowledge the concept of a
reverse confusion type of actionable claim in Big 0 Tire,291 which
rejected the plaintiff's evidence of a 22% rate of confusion and
granted summary judgment for the defendant without ever justify-
ing its reason for doing so.
4. Sunenblick v. Harrell and MCA, Inc.
Recently, a district court addressed the uniqueness of reverse
confusion as its own legal doctrine, and recognized the need for a
more appropriately tailored test. The Southern District of New
York, in Sunenblick v. Harrell and MCA, Inc.,292 acknowledged that
the doctrine of reverse confusion is still a relatively new concept,
and that the existing Polaroid test remains far from perfect.293
The plaintiff in Sunenblick operated an independent jazz com-
pany using the mark "UPTOWN RECORDS," and from 1979 to
1995 produced 35 recordings and sold a total of 80,000 units, all
under the "UPTOWN RECORDS" mark.294 Defendant, in conjunc-
tion with MCA records, began using its "MCA/UPTOWN RE-
CORDS" label in 1986 to produce rap and R&B recordings and,
between 1986 and 1994, sold 27 gold and platinum records.295
In addressing the Strength of Mark factor, the plaintiff argued
motion." Id. at 1539 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
289. Universal, 22 F.3d at 1539 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
290. id.
291. See-Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365
(10th cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978); supra part I.B.2.
292. 895 F. Supp. 616 (1995).
293. Id. at 628.
294. Id. at 620.
295. Id. at 622. A gold record is one which has sold more than 500,000 copies; a
platinum record has sold more than 1,000,000. Id. at 622 n.7.
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that the appropriate approach would be to reject the precedent from
the Second Circuit and instead apply law from other circuits which
held that the Strength of Mark factor should focus on the strength
of the junior user's mark, rather than the senior user's mark.296
The defendant disagreed, urging that the court was bound by prece-
dent in the Second Circuit; however, the court rejected the defen-
dant's argument and instead signalled its willingness to make new
law in the area of reverse confusion:
Defendants thus press the argument that this court is bound
by the decisional law of the Circuit in which it sits. The
court is not persuaded, however, that it Would be improper
to acknowledge the force of precedent outside this Circuit,
inasmuch as the doctrine of reverse confusion is still at an
early stage of development. It should be recalled that, in
applying the Polaroid factors to allegations of reverse con-
fusion, this Circuit has employed a test. that was originally
designed to evaluate cases of forward confusion. Indeed,
prior to Banff, reported cases of reverse confusion were
quite rare in any circuit, and virtually non-existent at the
time Judge Friendly authored Polaroid.297
The Southern District acknowledged that the Polaroid test was
initially developed for direct confusion and thus is not the most
appropriate test for reverse confusion. Yet, despite this acknowl-
edgement, the court nonetheless reverted to applying some of the
Polaroid factors as if it was deciding a direct confusion case. For
instance, with respect to the Good Faith factor, the court set out a
well-reasoned argument in which it demonstrated that defendant's
296. Id. at 627. The plaintiff argued that the court should follow the lead of the
Third Circuit, in Fisons Horticulture, and the Seventh Circuit in Sands, Taylor & Wood,
and analyze the strength of the junior user's mark, because the confusion in a reverse
confusion situation flows from the fact that the consumer recognizes the stronger of the
two, the junior user's mark, and thus believes that the senior user's mark somehow ema-
nates from the junior user's. Id. (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 627-28 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court took a progres-
sive stance in acknowledging that the doctrine of reverse confusion, due to its inception
based upon forward confusion premises, is a flawed one. Id. at 627-28. Thus, the court
determined that it must look, not solely to precedent within its own jurisdiction, but rather
to the better policy. See id.
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choice of a mark, which reflected his company's recording style,
combined with his lack of knowledge of the plaintiffs prior use of
the mark, weighed in his favor.298 It also stated that defendant's
failure to conduct a trademark search, alone, did not constitute bad
faith.299 The court then regressed, however, in failing to differenti-
ate between intent to misappropriate and intent to pass off, con-
cluding that the defendant did not act in bad faith because he did
not choose his mark with the intent to confuse customers.3°° The
court failed to acknowledge the fact that intent to pass off is irrele-
vant in a reverse confusion likelihood of confusion analysis. 1
Despite its shortcomings, the Sunenblick court broke ground in
recognizing the recency and uncertainty of the reverse confusion
doctrine and in asserting that courts must take a more progressive
approach in analyzing reverse confusion cases. Having determined
that it was not bound by precedent within its own circuit, the court
instead adopted the approach more appropriate for a reverse confu-
sion case and decided to analyze the Strength of Mark factor by
applying precedent from different circuits.30 2 Ironically though, in
adopting precedent from other circuits, the Sunenblick court also
caused further inconsistencies in the reverse confusion analysis by
following law from another circuit. Consequently, the recent
Sunenblick decision confirms that there is a need for a comprehen-
sive reformulation of the Polaroid test, specifically addressing the
reverse confusion legal paradigm.
298. Id. at 632-33.
299. Id. at 633.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 264 (intent is irrelevant).
302. Sunenblick, 895 F. Supp. at 628. The court asserted that it would follow the
reasoning of other courts, outside of its own circuit:
[Tihis court agrees with the observations made in Fisons Horticulture and
Sands, Taylor. It is the essence of reverse confusion that the senior user's mark
will be comparatively weaker-and will be probably much weaker indeed-than
that of the powerful junior user. It is in such cases, where the visibility and
strength of the junior user's mark have occupied the field, that the consumer is
likely to consider the senior user's product as either emanating from the junior
user or infringing upon the junior user's trademark rights. Consequently, the
court should properly examine the strength of the junior user's mark.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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IV. THE UNMODIFIED POLAROID TEST: AN INSUFFICIENT
ANALYSIS FOR REVERSE CONFUSION
A. The Problem: The Courts' Inconsistencies
An inherent problem exists in analyzing any likelihood of con-
fusion claim because it is a highly subjective, fact specific task,
and thus, it is difficult to establish bright line rules.3 °3 Moreover,
the difficulty becomes increasingly pervasive because the doctrine
was initially based on a different type of legal problem-direct
confusion-and few attempts have been made to tailor the doctrine
specifically to the reverse phenomena. As demonstrated above, the
net result is that these obstacles have created fragmented and in-
consistent case law in the area of reverse confusion. Courts, there-
fore, must examine the doctrine of reverse confusion more carefully
to determine in what aspects the Polaroid factors present a suffi-
cient test for analyzing reverse confusion and in what aspects they
do not provide a sufficient test.
B. Proposed Solutions
As novel problems, concepts and technologies evolve, courts
must examine new ways to analyze them, often by borrowing from
old doctrines and redeveloping them to fit the novel situations. For
instance, in 1921, Justice Cardozo referred to the then-evolving
technology known as the telephone and stated that, with new tech-
nology, courts should first try to apply existing law, and if that
approach failed, they should then develop law to conform to the
new technology.3°4 The courts, in addressing reverse confusion,
303. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("the ultimate conclusion as to whether a likelihood of confusion exists is not
to be determined in accordance with some rigid formula. The Polaroid factors serve as
a useful guide through a difficult quagmire. Each case, however, presents its own pecu-
liar circumstances.").
304. See Symposium, First Amendment and the Media: Regulating Interactive Com-
munications on the Information Highway, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
235, 262 & n.75 (1995) ("with new conditions there must be new rules" (citing BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS 137 (1921)). The symposium ad-
dressed, in part, the issue of how to change law to conform to changing technology.
Although the main issue in the symposium was changing technology, the same concepts
can be applied here.
For instance, one panelist cited Justice Cardozo's 1921 reference to telephones as
1995]
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have followed Cardozo's first step and tried to apply existing law
in the form of the Polaroid test. They have, in most cases, howev-
er, failed to move onto the second step-when the existing law has
not exactly fit, they have not gone on to develop new law. This is
evident, for instance, in the Tenth Circuit's Universal decision,3°5
and the Second Circuit's Gillette decision,3°  both of which
steadfastedly applied Intent as a factor in reverse confusion, failing
to recognize the differences in analyzing reverse confusion as op-
posed to direct confusion.
After acknowledging that the existing Polaroid test for reverse
confusion is insufficient, as the Sunenblick court has initially
done, °7 courts must proceed to the second step. They must not
only recognize a need for a new system of evaluating reverse con-
fusion, but they must also begin fulfilling that need by developing
new law to fit the reverse confusion situation specifically.
1. Bright Line Tests: Implausible Solution
Some commentators have offered revised systems of reverse
confusion analysis by proposing certain bright line rules.30 8 Such
rules offer solutions akin to mathematical equations, proposing that
certain situations should automatically dictate the equivalent out-
new technology and addressed the issue of how to apply the law to them. Id. at 262.
Another panelist referred to a 1915 case which held that motion pictures were not part
of the press, id. at 250 n.37, and a 1928 case which held that telephone wiretaps did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, which protected only people, not places, id. at n.39. This
panelist noted that it was not until 1948, 33 years later, that the Supreme Court held that
motion pictures were protected by the First Amendment, id. at n.38, and 1967, 39 years
later, that the Supreme Court recognized that privacy protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment extended to telephone transmissions, id. at n.40. In addressing the symposium's
issue of how to approach First Amendment privacy issues on the Internet, the panelist
referred back to these cases and said, "I think the courts are experiencing some of the
same conservatism, some of the same ignorance, and some of the same head-in-the-sand
qualities." Id. at 251'.
305. See Universal, 22 F.3d at 1532; see 'also supra notes 282-83 and accompanying
text.
306. See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575; see also supra notes 222-26 and accompanying
text.
307. See Sunenblick, 895 F. Supp. at 627-28; supra text accompanying note 297.
308. See, e.g., Long & Marks, supra note 47, at 28 ("It is the purpose of this article
to suggest those key factors particularly useful in analyzing reverse confusion cases. The
principles outlined below may seem too rigid and dogmatic, but they are submitted with
the thought that bright-line tests are possible and desirable in this area of law .... ).
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comes. For instance, situation A = solution B. 309  However, the
determination of the likelihood of confusion is a highly subjective
practice. Even in direct confusion, a likelihood of confusion deter-
mination by such a mathematical formula is not feasible because
the likelihood of confusion test is an analysis of several different
factors taken as a whole, in which no one factor is determinative.3 t°
Inherently, bright line tests cannot be uniformly applied to de-
terminations of such a subjective quality. However, courts can, at
least, adopt a more uniform approach by taking the lead from some
of the more reasoned approaches to analyzing and applying the
Polaroid factors within the context of a reverse confusion scenario.
2. A Revised Polaroid Test: The Best of Each Court
A better solution than implementing bright line tests is for the
courts to recognize reverse confusion as its own unique legal para-
digm, distinct from direct confusion, and to formulate a test specif-
ic for the reverse confusion situation. The best method for analyz-
309. Long and Marks set forth seven scenarios in which courts can automatically
determine who should prevail, the senior user or the junior user. Id. Some of these
proposed guidelines, however, do not take into account the very premise of a likelihood
of confusion determination, that in a seven or eight factor test, no single factor is disposi-
tive. See supra note 110. Their proposed scenarios, although some are extremely detailed
and particularized, discount both this premise and the fact that likelihood of confusion
determinations are extremely subjective and fact specific and should therefore each be
decided on an individual basis, applying each of the factors. For instance, the first two
guidelines are:
1. The senior user of a protectable mark always wins against a junior user who
adopts a confusingly similar mark with knowledge of the senior's prior usage.
2. A senior user who federally registers its mark prior to the junior user's first
use always wins.
Long & Marks, supra note 47, at 28.
Again, when taken in light of all other factors, even these guidelines are not fool-
proof. The first guideline, for instance, does not take into account quality of the product,
sophistication of the buyers, proximity of the products, or actual confusion, all of which,
when taken collectively, could significantly impact the outcome. Likewise, the second
guideline does not consider that the senior user's mark, although federally registered, may
be weak or that the two marks are not similar, or that the two products are not proximate,
or even that the senior user may have abandoned its mark.
310. See Plus, 722 F.2d at 1004 (no single Polaroid factor is determinative); Lois
Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 872 (referring to the likelihood of confusion test as a "difficult
quagmire"); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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ing reverse confusion is to borrow the factors from the direct con-
fusion Polaroid likelihood of confusion test and modify them to fit
into the reverse confusion context. Under this approach, some
factors could remain the same, while others would be readjusted to
fit into the reverse confusion context.
a. Factors Remaining the Same
Some of the Polaroid factors are not impacted by the reverse
situations of the parties and, therefore, can be applied equally to
reverse confusion as to direct confusion. One thing that must be
remembered, however, is that even if the factors need not be re-
vised for reverse confusion, the courts must still strive to battle the
inconsistencies among the circuits which appear even in direct
confusion cases.
For instance, in reverse confusion and direct confusion alike,
courts have applied two different approaches with respect to Quali-
ty of the Products, one which views goods of similar quality as
more likely to cause confusion and one which views similar goods
as less likely to cause confusion.31 This factor must be uniformly
applied, and the better approach is to treat two products of similar
quality as more likely to cause confusion than if the qualities were
dissimilar. In addition, courts might find it beneficial to view the
Quality factor in conjunction with the Sophistication of Purchasers.
While it is true that consumers are likely to use less care when
buying inexpensive goods, or goods of lesser quality, it is also true
that the sophistication of purchasers must be viewed in its entirety.
For instance, as the court in Reed Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax,
Inc.312 noted, consumers will use little care in purchasing a $5 bot-
tle of wax, unless it is a $5 bottle of car wax, to be applied to a
$20,000 car.313 In such cases, the totality of the situation must be
taken into account.
The courts have also taken divergent views on the Similarity of
the Marks factor. Some courts which view the words themselves
as dominating have treated phonetically identical marks as weigh-
311. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
312. 869 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. I11. 1994).
313. Id. at 1311-12; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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ing highly in favor of confusion." 4 Others have found that phonet-
ic similarity can be overcome by other differences in design, and
so have given little weight to this factor. 5  In addition, some
courts view the presence of a brand name in conjunction with a
mark as decreasing the likelihood of confusion,316 while others view
the presence of brand names as increasing it.317  Although this
factor can be applied equally for reverse confusion and direct con-
fusion alike, the courts must, nonetheless, apply the factor consis-
tently throughout the circuits.
The Bridging the Gap factor has been fairly consistently applied
and need not be dramatically revamped. However, certain courts,
such as the district court in Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg
Co. ,318 must be more pragmatic in examining this factor. In fact,
courts may be well-advised to analyze this factor in conjunction
with Proximity of the Products, taking into account not only the
stated intentions of the senior user to expand, but also the probabil-
ity that the two products are so closely related that the consumers
will perceive them as emanating from the same source, thereby
conceptually bridging the gap in their own minds.31 9 In Kellogg,
where one party produced breakfast meat substitutes and frozen egg
substitutes using the "HEARTWISE" mark, and the other party
produced both ready-to-eat cereal using the "HEARTWISE" mark
and frozen waffles under another mark, the court found it unlikely
that either party would expand into the other's market.320 However,
314. See, e.g., Shell, 992 F.2d at 1206 (words themselves dominate similarity of
marks despite differences in design).
315. See, e.g., Universal, 22 F.3d at 1531 (design dominates such that overall impres-
sion can outweigh the words themselves).
316. See, e.g., Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573 (use of the brand name Right Guard immedi-
ately following the mark "Sport Stick" decreased rather than increased the likelihood of
confusion).
317. See, e.g., Banff, 841 F.2d at 492 (use of the store name Bloomingdale's on
clothes with "B-wear" mark increased the likelihood of confusion by linking defendant,
Bloomingdale's name with plaintiffs good will).
318. 732 F. Supp. 1417 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
319. See supra note 185 and accompanying text; see also McGregor-Doniger, 599
F.2d at 1134 (citing as important "the likelihood that customers may be confused as to
the source of the products, rather than as to the products themselves").
320. Worthington, 732 F. Supp. at 1450-51; see also supra note 186. But see Plus,
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the court failed to address the likelihood that because Kellogg is a
well-known mass merchandiser and producer of breakfast products,
consumers might perceive the "HEARTWISE" goods of
Worthington as emanating from the same source as the
"HEARTWISE" goods of Kellogg.
b. The Revised Factors
The factors discussed immediately above321-Quality of the
Products, Sophistication of Purchasers, Similarity of Marks, and
Bridging the Gap-have been adequately, although inconsistently,
defined through case law and may be applied equally to direct
confusion and reverse confusion alike, so long as they are applied
consistently from circuit to circuit and case to case.322 'However,
other factors-Good Faith/Intent, Proximity of the Products, Actual
Confusion, and Strength of the Mark-which have been ill-defined
throughout case law, must first be more adequately defined in
trademark infringement overall. In addition, some of these factors,
Good Faith especially, must then, be more narrowly tailored to
specifically address reverse confusion situations.
The most crucial step in reformulating the likelihood of confu-
sion determination is the Good Faith factor, or Intent. In balancing
this factor, courts must remember that, even in direct confusion
cases, good faith does not affect the likelihood of confusion per
se,323 and, especially in reverse confusion, Intent to pass off is not
a factor.324 Typical good faith issues, such as whether the junior
user conducted a trademark search or relied on counsel, might
appropriately weigh in the defendant's favor in assessing the
amount of relief awarded. 325 Likewise, typical bad faith issues,
564 F. Supp. at 989 (noting that the aggressiveness of the parent company, Richardson-
Vicks, weighed in favor of bridging the gap).
321. See supra part IV.B.2.a.
322. See, e.g., supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text; 314-15 and accompanying
text; 316-17 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 19, 264 and accompanying text.
325. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23;3[31[c] (where defendant
honestly relies on objectively reasonable advice of counsel, defendant cannot be regarded
as "willful" infringer for the purpose of assessing damages).
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such as a defendant's continued use of a mark despite its knowl-
edge that another company was already using the mark, can weigh
against the defendant in assessing damages or relief. 326 However,
these issues should be considered only once the overall, infringe-
ment issue has been determined. Courts must be wary of allowing
these Good Faith issues to play a role in balancing the likelihood
of confusion factors. Whether the defendant conducted a trademark
search, or relied on counsel is simply irrelevant in determining
whether consumers are likely to be confused, both in reverse confu-
sion and direct confusion determinations.327
Moreover, it is time that all courts acknowledge that Intent to
trade on the good will of the senior user, while it may be relevant
in determining damages in direct confusion, 328 is simply not an
issue at any stage in the reverse confusion analysis. In 1986 the
Third Circuit, in defining reverse confusion, differentiated it from
direct confusion by explaining that in reverse confusion a junior
user is simply not seeking to profit from the good will associated
with the senior user's mark.329 The Seventh Circuit then reiterated
this notion in Quaker that, by definition, intent is irrelevant in
reverse confusion because the defendant is not trying to pass off
his goods as emanating from the same source as those of the senior
user.330  The other circuits which continue to focus on intent in
reverse confusion, such as the Tenth Circuit in Universal,331 and the
Second Circuit in Gillette,332 must examine the definition of reverse
confusion and realize the incongruity of focusing on the intent of
the junior user to pass off its product or trade on the senior user's
326. See generally id. § 23.31[2]; see also Big 0 Tire, 561 F.2d at 1373-76 (court's
holding that defendant's false statements harmed the plaintiffs reputation is a factor in
assessment of damages).
327. See supra note 162.
328. See supra note 166 (bad faith is a factor to be weighed in determining injunc-
tive relief).
329. See Ameritech, Inc v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964
(6th Cir. 1987); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
330. See Quaker, 978 F.2d at 961; supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
331. See Universal, 22 F.3d at 1532; supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
332. See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575; supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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good will in a reverse confusion context.333
Another factor which must be reformulated for the reverse con-
fusion determination is the Strength of the Mark. This should be
done in two ways. First, Strength of Mark should be assessed in
terms of the junior user's mark. This notion, as first developed by
the Seventh Circuit in Quaker334 and most recently adopted by the
court in Sunenblick,335 focuses on the difference between direct and
reverse confusion. If in reverse confusion the junior user has so
saturated the market that the consumer comes to believe that the
senior user's product somehow emanates from the junior user,336
then the courts should analyze the strength of the junior user's
mark and whether it will potentially confuse consumers.
Second, Strength of Mark should focus on the attributes of the
mark itself and should not be synonymous solely with strength of
the junior user's advertising budget, or with lack of senior user's
financial success, as has been the case in some courts' determina-
tions. 337 Only when a mark is found to be descriptive, or otherwise
non-inherently distinctive, should the court examine secondary
meaning,338 and even then, secondary meaning should focus on
factors such as third party usage, commonality, and commercial
strength, 339 not on company finances alone.
In applying the Proximity of Products factor, courts need to
develop consistent, objective guidelines as to which types of prod-
ucts can be considered proximate. For instance, general categories
must be established such that the courts cannot continue to generate
333. See, e.g., Ameritech, 811 F.2d at 964; Quaker, 978 F.2d at 960-61.
334. See Quaker, 978 F.2d at 959; supra note 258 and accompanying text.
335. See Sunenblick, 895 F. Supp. at 628; supra note 302 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (citing Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573,
where the court analyzed the senior user's sales figures in determining strength of mark);
supra note 131 (citing Pump, 746 F. Supp. at 1171, where the court held that band's fail-
ure to get a record contract was a sign of a weak mark).
338. See supra notes 73-74. Conversely, there is no secondary meaning requirement
for suggestive, or otherwise inherently distinctive marks. But see Gillette, 984 F.2d at
572 (where the court determined that the mark was suggestive and then proceeded none-
theless to examine secondary meaning); supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent decisions whereby one case holds that vitamins and
vegetable drinks are in the same general markets while another
case holds that crackers and corn chips are not.340
Courts should also recognize the Plus district court's finding
341
that, in the modem day context of corporate diversification and
mass merchandising, it is more likely that two types of products
could emanate from the same source, or, at least, that consumers
are more likely to perceive them as emanating from the same
source.342 The court in In re Shell Oil Co. 343 was progressive in
recognizing that auto parts and oil lubes could either emanate from
the same source, or that consumers could, at least, likely perceive
that they do.3" Conversely, the court in Gillette was remiss in not
addressing whether lip balm and deodorant, even if sold in different
parts of the store, could nonetheless be considered proximate by the
purchasing public.345 The emergence of mass merchandising means
that courts must give less. credence to physical proximity of goods
within a store, and place more emphasis on whether consumers
could perceive two products as emanating from the same source.
When an enormous conglomerate such as Philip Morris, produces
everything from Marlboro cigarettes and Miller Beer to Kraft Mac-
aroni & Cheese and Louis Rich deli meat, it could have its prod-
ucts at the grocery store check out, in the dry goods section, in the
dairy section, and even in liquor stores or at newsstands. Thus,
considering physical proximity within stores, alone, is insufficient.
Finally, surveys presenting evidence of actual confusion must,
in all cases, be afforded the utmost attention. General standards for
reviewing surveys must be clearly delineated by the courts, and
reasons for rejecting survey evidence within individual cases must
be specifically addressed. 346 There is no better evidence of likeli-
hood of confusion than actual confusion. The courts' treatment of
the Actual Confusion factor, however, has been inconsistent in all
340. See supra note 176.
341. See Plus, 564 F. Supp. at 991-92.
342. Id.; see also supra notes 177, 315-17 and accompanying text.
343. 992 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
344. Id. at 1207; supra note 174.
345. Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573-73; supra note 218.
346. See, e.g., supra note 288.
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types of infringement actions;347 thus, a more uniform approach is
needed overall:
There are almost as many different answers to the questions
of whose confusion is prohibited and when it must occur as
there are judicial decisions on the subject. Such a variance
is not surprising. Court decisions in this area often involve
close, fact specific determinations and competing economic
interests. However, the nature of infringement cases should
not prevent the courts from formulating guidelines to en-
hance judicial consistency.348
Although the courts themselves must continue to set guidelines
as to who must be confused and when349 in order to establish what
type of evidence is relevant, evidence in the form of questions of
material fact should not be questions for the court.3 0 For instance,
in Universal where the plaintiff presented a seemingly feasible
survey which yielded a 22% rate of confusion, the court should not
have, without explanation, dismissed the conflicting survey results
and granted summary judgment.3 1  Although the likelihood of
confusion determination is a somewhat subjective one, it should not
fall victim to the whims of the court.5 2
347. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
348. Allen, supra note 140, at 356 (emphasis added).
349. See, e.g., supra note 140 (courts must determine whether to consider evidence
of confusion from actual consumers only, or to allow also for evidence from potential
purchasers, or even end-users).
350. See Universal, 22 F.3d at 1538-39 (Ebel, J., Dissenting) (jury should weigh
evidence raising material issue of fact); supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
351. See Universal, 22 F.3d at 1536; see also supra note 139 (stating that the incon-
sistency of courts in evaluating evidence of actual confusion has been exacerbated by the
courts' failure to describe the evidence and explain why they find it either probative or
non-probative).
352. See id. at 1539 (Ebel, J., dissenting) ("It is the jury who should weigh the evi-
dence rather than a judge on a summary judgment motion.") (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)); see also Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 56(c) (Sum-
mary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law").
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of reverse confusion was first judicially recog-
nized nearly 20 years ago; yet, since that time, courts have made
little progress in forming a system of analysis specific to the legal
paradigm. It is a basic function of the law that, as new systems
and concepts of law arise, society looks to the courts to define the
legal parameters. 353 However, in the realm of reverse confusion,
the courts have consistently failed to accurately define these param-
eters. As small companies become more aggressive in protecting
their marks and reverse confusion claims become increasingly prev-
alent, the courts must take progressive steps toward revamping the
Polaroid test to relate more accurately within the reverse confusion
context. Some courts have begun by acknowledging reverse confu-
sion as its own legal phenomenon, separate and distinct from direct
confusion, and attempting to redefine some of traditional direct
confusion tests. It is now up to prospective courts to continue to
shape a test specific to the reverse confusion situation.
353. See generally supra note 304.
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